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Unfunded Mandates Reform Act: History, Impact, and Issues 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) established requirements for enacting 
certain legislation and issuing certain regulations that would impose enforceable duties on state, local, or 
tribal governments or on the private sector. UMRA refers to obligations imposed by such legislation and 
regulations as “mandates” (either “intergovernmental” or “private sector,” depending on the entities 
affected). The direct cost to affected entities of meeting these obligations are referred to as “mandate 
costs,” and when the federal government does not provide funding to cover these costs, the mandate is 
termed “unfunded.” 
UMRA incorporates numerous definitions, exclusions, and exceptions that specify what forms and types 
of mandates are subject to its requirements, termed “covered mandates.” Covered mandates do not 
include many federal actions with potentially significant financial impacts on nonfederal entities. This 
report’s primary purpose is to describe the kinds of legislative and regulatory provisions that are subject 
to UMRA’s requirements, and, on this basis, to assess UMRA’s impact on federal mandates. The report 
also examines debates that occurred, both before and since UMRA’s enactment, concerning what kinds of 
provisions UMRA ought to cover, and considers the implications of experience under UMRA for possible 
future revisions of its scope of coverage. 
This report also describes the requirements UMRA imposes on congressional and agency actions to 
establish covered mandates. For most legislation and regulations covered by UMRA, these requirements 
are only informational. For reported legislation that would impose covered mandates on the 
intergovernmental or private sectors, UMRA requires the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to provide an 
estimate of mandate costs. Similarly, for regulations that would impose covered mandates on the 
intergovernmental or private sectors, UMRA requires that the issuing agency provide an estimate of 
mandate costs (although the specifics of the estimates required for legislation and for regulations differ 
somewhat). Also, solely for legislation that would impose covered intergovernmental mandates, UMRA 
establishes a point of order in each house of Congress through which the chamber can decline to 
consider the legislation. This report examines UMRA’s implementation, focusing on the respective 
requirements for mandate cost estimates on legislation and regulations, and on the point of order 
procedure for legislation proposing unfunded intergovernmental mandates. 
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Summary 
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) culminated years of effort by state and 
local government officials and business interests to control, if not eliminate, the imposition of 
unfunded intergovernmental and private-sector federal mandates. Advocates argued the statute 
was needed to forestall federal legislation and regulations that imposed obligations on state and 
local governments or businesses that resulted in higher costs and inefficiencies. Opponents argued 
that federal mandates may be necessary to achieve national objectives in areas where voluntary 
action by state and local governments and business failed to achieve desired results. 
UMRA provides a framework for the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to estimate the direct 
costs of mandates in legislative proposals to state and local governments and to the private sector, 
and for issuing agencies to estimate the direct costs of mandates in proposed regulations to 
regulated entities. Aside from these informational requirements, UMRA controls the imposition 
of mandates only through a procedural mechanism allowing Congress to decline to consider 
unfunded intergovernmental mandates in proposed legislation if they are estimated to cost more 
than specified threshold amounts. UMRA applies to any provision in legislation, statute, or 
regulation that would impose an enforceable duty upon state and local governments or the private 
sector. It does not apply to conditions of federal assistance; duties stemming from participation in 
voluntary federal programs; rules issued by independent regulatory agencies; rules issued without 
a general notice of proposed rulemaking; and rules and legislative provisions that cover 
individual constitutional rights, discrimination, emergency assistance, grant accounting and 
auditing procedures, national security, treaty obligations, and certain elements of Social Security.  
State and local government officials argue that UMRA has restrained the growth of unfunded 
federal mandates, but that its coverage should be broadened, with special consideration given to 
including conditions of federal financial assistance. During the 112th Congress, H.R. 4078, the 
Red Tape Reduction and Small Business Job Creation Act: Title IV, the Unfunded Mandates 
Information and Transparency Act of 2012, passed by the House on July 26, 2012, would have 
broadened UMRA’s coverage to include both direct and indirect costs, such as foregone profits 
and costs passed onto consumers, and, when requested by the chair or ranking Member of a 
committee, the prospective costs of legislation that would change conditions of federal financial 
assistance. The UMRA provisions in the bill (reintroduced as H.R. 899, the Unfunded Mandates 
Information and Transparency Act of 2013, during the 113th Congress), as well as several other 
bills considered during the 112th Congress, would have made private-sector mandates subject to a 
substantive point of order and would have removed UMRA’s exemption for rules issued by most 
independent agencies. Other organizations have argued that UMRA’s coverage should be 
maintained or reinforced by adding exclusions for mandates regarding public health, safety, 
workers’ rights, environmental protection, and the disabled.  
This report examines debates over what constitutes an unfunded federal mandate and UMRA’s 
implementation. It focuses on UMRA’s requirement that CBO issue written cost estimate 
statements for federal mandates in legislation, its procedures for raising points of order in the 
House and Senate concerning unfunded federal mandates in legislation, and its requirement that 
federal agencies prepare written cost estimate statements for federal mandates in rules. It also 
assesses UMRA’s impact on federal mandates and arguments concerning UMRA’s future, 
focusing on UMRA’s definitions, exclusions, and exceptions that currently exempt many federal 
actions with potentially significant financial impacts on nonfederal entities. An examination of 
the rise of unfunded federal mandates as a national issue and a summary of UMRA’s legislative 
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history are provided in Appendix A. Citations to UMRA points of order raised in the House and 
Senate are provided in Appendix B. 
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An Overview of UMRA, Its Origins, and Provisions 
Overview 
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) established requirements for enacting 
certain legislation and issuing certain regulations that would impose enforceable duties on state, 
local, or tribal governments or on the private sector.1 UMRA refers to obligations imposed by 
such legislation and regulations as “mandates” (either “intergovernmental” or “private sector,” 
depending on the entities affected). The direct cost to affected entities of meeting these 
obligations are referred to as “mandate costs,” and when the federal government does not provide 
funding to cover these costs, the mandate is termed “unfunded.” 
UMRA incorporates numerous definitions, exclusions, and exceptions that specify what forms 
and types of mandates are subject to its requirements, termed “covered mandates.” Covered 
mandates do not include many federal actions with potentially significant financial impacts on 
nonfederal entities. This report’s primary purpose is to describe the kinds of legislative and 
regulatory provisions that are subject to UMRA’s requirements, and, on this basis, to assess 
UMRA’s impact on federal mandates. The report also examines debates that occurred, both before 
and since UMRA’s enactment, concerning what kinds of provisions UMRA ought to cover, and 
considers the implications of experience under UMRA for possible future revisions of its scope of 
coverage. 
This report also describes the requirements UMRA imposes on congressional and agency actions 
to establish covered mandates. For most legislation and regulations covered by UMRA, these 
requirements are only informational. For reported legislation that would impose covered 
mandates on the intergovernmental or private sectors, UMRA requires the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) to provide an estimate of mandate costs. Similarly, for regulations that would 
impose covered mandates on the intergovernmental or private sectors, UMRA requires that the 
issuing agency provide an estimate of mandate costs (although the specifics of the estimates 
required for legislation and for regulations differ somewhat). Also, solely for legislation that 
would impose covered intergovernmental mandates, UMRA establishes a point of order in each 
house of Congress through which the chamber can decline to consider the legislation. This report 
examines UMRA’s implementation, focusing on the respective requirements for mandate cost 
estimates on legislation and regulations, and on the point of order procedure for legislation 
proposing unfunded intergovernmental mandates. 
Origin 
The concept of unfunded mandates rose to national prominence during the 1970s and 1980s 
primarily through the response of state and local government officials to changes in the nature of 
federal intergovernmental grant-in-aid programs and to regulations affecting state and local 
governments. Before then, the federal government had traditionally relied on the provision of 
voluntary grant-in-aid funding to encourage state and local governments to perform particular 
activities or provide particular services that were deemed to be in the national interest. These 
                                                 
1 P.L. 104-4; 109 Stat. 48 et seq.; and 2 U.S.C. §602, 632, 653, 658-658(g), 1501-1504, 1511-1516, 1531-1538, 1551-
1556, and 1571. 
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arrangements were viewed as reflecting, at least in part, the constitutional protections afforded 
state and local governments as separate, sovereign entities. During the 1970s and 1980s, however, 
state and local government advocates argued that a “dramatic shift” occurred in the way the 
federal government dealt with states and localities. Instead of relying on the technique of 
subsidization to achieve its goals, the federal government was increasingly relying on “new, more 
intrusive, and more compulsory” programs and regulations that required compliance under the 
threat of civil or criminal penalties, imposed federal fiscal sanctions for failure to comply with the 
programs’ requirements, or preempted state and local government authority to act in the area.2 
These new, more intrusive and compulsory programs and regulations came to be referred to as 
“unfunded mandates” on states and localities. 
State and local government advocates viewed these unfunded federal intergovernmental mandates 
as inconsistent with the traditional view of American federalism, which was based on 
cooperation, not compulsion. They argued that a federal statute was needed to forestall federal 
legislation and regulations that imposed obligations on state and local governments that resulted 
in higher costs and inefficiencies. UMRA’s enactment in 1995 culminated years of effort by state 
and local government officials to control, if not eliminate, the imposition of unfunded federal 
mandates. 
Advocates of regulatory reform adapted the concept of unfunded mandates to their view that 
federal regulations often impose financial burdens on private enterprise. Critics of government 
regulation of business argued that these regulations impose unfunded mandates on the private 
sector, just as federal programs and regulations impose fiscal obligations on state and local 
governments. As a result, various business organizations subject to increased federal regulation 
came to support state and local government efforts to enact federal legislation to control unfunded 
federal intergovernmental mandates. Private-sector advocates argued that they, too, should be 
provided relief from what they viewed as burdensome federal regulations that hinder economic 
growth.3 Subsequently, proposals to control unfunded mandates that were developed in the early 
1990s contained provisions addressing not only federal intergovernmental mandates, but federal 
private-sector mandates as well. 
During floor debate on legislation that became UMRA, sponsors of the measure emphasized its 
role in bringing “our system of federalism back into balance, by serving as a check against the 
easy imposition of unfunded mandates.”4 Opponents argued that federal mandates may be 
necessary to achieve national objectives in areas where voluntary action by state and local 
governments or business failed to achieve desired results. See Appendix A for a more detailed 
examination of the rise of unfunded federal mandates as a national issue and of UMRA’s 
legislative history.5 
                                                 
2 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), Regulatory Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact, 
and Reform, A-95 (Washington, DC: ACIR, 1984), pp. 1-18. 
3 Mary McElvenn, “The Federal Impact on Business,” Nation’s Business, vol. 79, no. 1 (January 1991), pp. 23-26; 
David Warner, “Regulations’ Staggering Costs,” Nation’s Business, vol. 80, no. 6 (June 1992), pp. 50-53; Michael 
Barrier, “Taxing the Man Behind the Tree,” Nation’s Business, vol. 81, no. 9 (September 1993), pp. 31, 32; and 
Michael Barrier, “Mandates Foes Smell a Victory,” Nation’s Business, vol. 82, no. 9 (September 1994), p. 50. 
4 Senator Dirk Kempthorne, “Unfunded Mandate Reform Act,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, vol. 141, 
part 1 (January 12, 1995), p. 1166. 
5 Senator Frank Lautenberg, “Unfunded Mandate Reform Act,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, vol. 141, 
part 1 (January 12, 1995), p. 1193. 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act: History, Impact, and Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 3 
Summary of UMRA’s Provisions 
The congressional commitment to reshaping intergovernmental relations through UMRA is 
reflected in its eight statutory purposes: 
(1) to strengthen the partnership between the Federal Government and State, local, and tribal 
governments; 
(2) to end the imposition, in the absence of full consideration by Congress, of Federal 
mandates on State, local, and tribal governments without adequate Federal funding, in a 
manner that may displace other essential State, local, and tribal governmental priorities; 
(3) to assist Congress in its consideration of proposed legislation establishing or revising 
Federal programs containing Federal mandates affecting State, local, and tribal governments, 
and the private sector by—(A) providing for the development of information about the 
nature and size of mandates in proposed legislation; and (B) establishing a mechanism to 
bring such information to the attention of the Senate and the House of Representatives before 
the Senate and the House of Representatives vote on proposed legislation; 
(4) to promote informed and deliberate decisions by Congress on the appropriateness of 
Federal mandates in any particular instance; 
(5) to require that Congress consider whether to provide funding to assist State, local, and 
tribal governments in complying with Federal mandates, to require analyses of the impact of 
private sector mandates, and through the dissemination of that information provide informed 
and deliberate decisions by Congress and Federal agencies and retain competitive balance 
between the public and private sectors; 
(6) to establish a point-of-order vote on the consideration in the Senate and House of 
Representatives of legislation containing significant Federal intergovernmental mandates 
without providing adequate funding to comply with such mandates; 
(7) to assist Federal agencies in their consideration of proposed regulations affecting State, 
local, and tribal governments, by—(A) requiring that Federal agencies develop a process to 
enable the elected and other officials of State, local, and tribal governments to provide input 
when Federal agencies are developing regulations; and (B) requiring that Federal agencies 
prepare and consider estimates of the budgetary impact of regulations containing Federal 
mandates upon State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector before adopting 
such regulations, and ensuring that small governments are given special consideration in that 
process; and 
(8) to begin consideration of the effect of previously imposed Federal mandates, including 
the impact on State, local, and tribal governments of Federal court interpretations of Federal 
statutes and regulations that impose Federal intergovernmental mandates.6  
To achieve its purposes, UMRA’s Title I established a procedural framework to shape 
congressional deliberations concerning covered unfunded intergovernmental and private-sector 
mandates. This framework requires CBO to estimate the direct mandate costs of 
intergovernmental mandates exceeding $50 million and of private-sector mandates exceeding 
$100 million (in any fiscal year) proposed in any measure reported from committee. It also 
                                                 
6 2 U.S.C. §1501. 
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establishes a point of order against consideration of legislation that contained intergovernmental 
mandates with mandate costs estimated to exceed the threshold amount. In addition, Title II 
requires federal administrative agencies, unless otherwise prohibited by law, to assess the effects 
on state and local governments and the private sector of proposed and final federal rules and to 
prepare a written statement of estimated costs and benefits for any mandate requiring an 
expenditure exceeding $100 million in any given year. All threshold amounts under these 
provisions are adjusted annually for inflation.7 
In general, the requirements of Titles I and II apply to any provision in legislation, statute, or 
regulation that would impose an enforceable duty upon state and local governments or the private 
sector. However, UMRA does not apply to conditions of federal assistance, duties stemming from 
participation in voluntary federal programs, rules issued by independent regulatory agencies, or 
rules issued without a general notice of proposed rulemaking. Exceptions also exist for rules and 
legislative provisions that cover individual constitutional rights, discrimination, emergency 
assistance, grant accounting and auditing procedures, national security, treaty obligations, and 
certain elements of Social Security legislation.8 
UMRA’s Title III also called for a review of federal intergovernmental mandates to be completed 
by the now-defunct U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) within 
18 months of enactment.9 ACIR completed a preliminary report on federal intergovernmental 
mandates in January 1996, but the final report was not released.10 Finally, UMRA’s Title IV 
authorizes judicial review of federal agency compliance with Title II provisions.11 
What Is an Unfunded Federal Mandate? 
One of the first issues Congress faced when considering unfunded federal mandate legislation 
was how to define the concept. For example, during a November 3, 1993, congressional hearing 
on unfunded mandate legislation, Senator Judd Gregg argued, 
Any bill reported out this committee [Governmental Affairs] should precisely define what 
constitutes an unfunded federal mandate.... An appropriate definition is crucial because it 
will drive almost everything else that occurs. Without a precise definition, endless litigation 
would likely ensue over what is and what is not an unfunded federal mandate. A true 
solution to the problem cannot allow it to become more cost-effective to pay the bills than to 
seek payment. Furthermore, the definition cannot be too restrictive. It would solve nothing to 
                                                 
7 2 U.S.C §658; and 2 U.S.C. §1532. 
8 2 U.S.C 658(5)(A), (7)(A) and (10), and 2 U.S.C. §1503. 
9 2 U.S.C. §1551-1553. 
10 ACIR funding was withdrawn following the release for public comment and a hearing on the draft report on federal 
mandates. ACIR was required by UMRA to conduct the study and to make recommendations for mitigating the effect 
mandates have on state and local governments. The draft report recommended the elimination of a number of federal 
mandates which had strong support in Congress. ACIR’s commission members decided not to release the report in a 
party-line vote. Most observers concluded that the draft report was a contributing factor in ACIR’s losing its funding. 
See, John Kincaid, “Review of ‘The Politics of Unfunded Mandates: Whither Federalism?’ by Paul L. Posner,” 
Political Science Quarterly, vol. 114, no. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 322-323. 
11 2 U.S.C. §1571. 
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cut off one particular type of unfunded mandate, only to prompt Congressional use of 
another to accelerate.12 
The difficulty Congress faced in defining the concept was that there were strong disagreements, 
among academics, practitioners, and elected officials, over how to define it. These disagreements 
appear motivated by concerns about which classes of costs incurred by state and local 
governments (or the private sector) should be identified and controlled for in the legislative or 
regulatory process. They have typically been conducted, however, as disputes about which classes 
of such costs are properly considered as obligatory requirements on the affected entities. The 
resulting focus on whether or not particular kinds of costs are “mandatory” has tended to obscure 
consideration of the core policy question concerning what kinds of costs should be subjected to 
informational requirements or procedural restrictions such as those that UMRA establishes. 
Competing Definitions 
In 1979, one set of federalism scholars defined unfunded federal intergovernmental mandates 
broadly as including “any responsibility, action, procedure, or anything else that is imposed by 
constitutional, administrative, executive, or judicial action as a direct order or that is required as a 
condition of aid.”13 In 1984, ACIR offered a rationale for defining unfunded federal 
intergovernmental mandates which excluded conditions of aid. ACIR argued that defining 
unfunded federal intergovernmental mandates was difficult because federal grant-in-aid programs 
typically include both incentives and mandates backed by sanctions or penalties: 
Few federal programs affecting state and local governments are pure types.... Every grant-in-
aid program, including General Revenue Sharing, the least restrictive form of aid, comes 
with federal “strings” attached. Here, as in other areas, there is no such thing as a free 
lunch.... 
In the intergovernmental sphere, then, [mandates] and subsidy are less like different parts of 
a dichotomy than opposing ends of a continuum. At one extreme is the general support grant 
with just a few associated conditions or rules; at the other is the costly, but wholly unfunded, 
national “mandate.” In between are many programs combining subsidy and [mandate] 
approaches, in varying degrees and in various ways.14 
ACIR argued that because federal grant-in-aid programs typically combine subsidy and mandate 
approaches, grant-in-aid programs should be classified according to their degree of compulsion. It 
argued that conditions of grant aid should not be classified as a mandate because “one of the most 
important features of the grant-in-aid is that its acceptance is still viewed legally as entirely 
voluntary” and “although it is difficult for many jurisdictions to forego substantial financial 
benefits, this option remains real.”15 ACIR also argued that most grant conditions affect only the 
                                                 
12 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Federal Mandates on State and Local Governments, 
103rd Cong., 1st sess., November 3, 1993, S.Hrg. 103-405 (Washington: GPO, 1994), p. 66. 
13 Catherine H. Lovell, Max Neiman, Robert Kneisel, Adam Rose, and Charles Tobin, Federal and State Mandating on 
Local Governments: Report to the National Science Foundation (Riverside, CA: University of California, June 1979), 
p. 32. 
14 ACIR, Regulatory Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact, and Reform, A-95 (Washington, DC: ACIR, 1984), p. 4. 
15 Ibid. The Supreme Court has emphasized the voluntary nature of federal grant programs and the fact that states and 
private parties remain free to accept or reject the offer of federal funds and thus avoid the attached conditions. “This 
Court has repeatedly upheld against constitutional challenge the use of this technique to induce governments and 
private parties to cooperate voluntarily with federal policy.” Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (Chief 
(continued...) 
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administration of those activities funded by the program, and “grants-in-aid generally provide 
significant benefits to the recipient jurisdiction.”16 
ACIR argued that federal grant-in-aid programs that “cannot be side-stepped, without incurring 
some federal sanction, by the simple expedient of refusing to participate in a single federal 
assistance program” should be considered mandates.17 ACIR provided four examples of federal 
activities that, in the absence of sufficient compensatory funding, could be an unfunded 
intergovernmental mandate: (1) direct legal orders that must be complied with under the threat of 
civil or criminal penalties; (2) crosscutting or generally applicable requirements imposed on 
grants across the board to further national social and economic policies; (3) programs that impose 
federal fiscal sanctions in one program area or activity to influence state and local government 
policy in another area; and (4) federal preemption of state and local government law.18 
In 1994, several organizations representing state and local governments issued a set of unfunded 
mandate principles which defined unfunded federal intergovernmental mandates as 
• any federal requirement that compels state or local activities resulting in 
additional state or local expenditures; 
• any federal requirement that imposes additional conditions or increases the level 
of state and local expenditures needed to maintain eligibility for existing federal 
grants; 
• any reduction in the rate of federal matching for existing grants; and 
• any federal requirement that reduces the productivity of existing state or local 
taxes and fees and/or that increases the cost of raising state and local revenue 
(including the costs of borrowing).19 
Also in 1994, ACIR introduced the term “federally induced costs” to replace what it described as 
“the pejorative and definitional baggage associated with the term ‘mandates.’”20 ACIR identified 
the following types of federal activities that expose states and localities to additional costs: 
• statutory direct orders; 
• total and partial statutory preemptions; 
• grant-in-aid conditions on spending and administration, including matching 
requirements; 
• federal income tax provisions;  
                                                                 
(...continued) 
Justice Burger announcing judgment of the Court); see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., p. 7. 
18 Ibid., pp. 7-10. 
19 National Conference of State Legislatures, “Unfunded Mandate Principles,” Washington, DC, 1994, p. 1 cited in 
CRS Report 95-62, Mandates and the Congress, by Sandra S. Osbourn (out of print, available by request). 
20 ACIR, Federally Induced Costs Affecting State and Local Governments, M-193 (Washington, DC: ACIR, 1994), p. 
3. 
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• federal court decisions; and 
• administrative rules issued by federal agencies, including regulatory delays and 
non-enforcement.21 
ACIR defended its inclusion of grant-in-aid conditions in its list of “federally induced costs,” 
which it had excluded from its definition of federal mandates a decade earlier, by asserting that 
although the option of refusing to accept federal grants “seemed plausible when federal aid 
constituted a small and highly compartmentalized part of state and local revenues, it overlooks 
current realities. Many grant conditions have become far more integral to state and local 
activities—and far less subject to voluntary forbearance—than originally suggested by the 
contractual model.”22 
On April 28, 1994, John Kincaid, ACIR’s executive director, testified at a congressional hearing 
that legislation concerning unfunded mandates “should recognize that unfunded Federal mandates 
include, in reality, a range of Federally-induced costs for which reimbursements may be 
legitimate considerations.”23 State and local government officials generally advocated the 
inclusion of ACIR’s “federally induced costs” in legislation placing conditions on the imposition 
of unfunded intergovernmental mandates. However, organizations representing various 
environmental and social groups, such as the Committee on the Appointment of People With 
Disabilities, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the American Federation of State, County, 
and Municipal Employees, and the Service Employees International Union, argued that ACIR’s 
definition was too broad. These groups testified at various congressional hearings that some 
federal mandates, particularly those involving the environment and constitutional rights, should 
be retained, even if they were unfunded.24 
Statutory Direct Orders 
With respect to definitions, there was, and continues to be, a general consensus among federalism 
scholars, state and local government officials, and other organizations that federal policies which 
impose unavoidable costs on state and local governments or business are, in the absence of 
sufficient compensatory funding, unfunded federal mandates. Because statutory direct orders, 
such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which bars employment discrimination 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, are compulsory, they are considered 
federal mandates. In the absence of sufficient compensatory funding, they are unfunded federal 
mandates. However, there was, and continues to be, a general consensus that some statutory 
direct orders, particularly those involving the guarantee of constitutional rights, should be exempt 
from legislation placing conditions on the imposition of unfunded federal mandates.25 For 
                                                 
21 Ibid., p. 19. ACIR also included laws that expose state and local governments to liability lawsuits, which, at the time, 
affected such programs as the Superfund toxic wastes cleanup program. 
22 Ibid., p. 20. 
23 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Federal Mandate Reform Legislation, 103rd Cong., 2nd 
sess., April 28, 1994, S.Hrg. 103-1019 (Washington: GPO, 1995), p. 56. 
24 Ibid., pp. 53-55, 57-63, 68-70, 162-185, 200-230 and 247-249; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs and Senate Committee on the Budget; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Federal 
Mandates on State and Local Governments, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., November 3, 1993, S.Hrg. 103-405 (Washington: 
GPO, 1994), p. 241-245; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, S.1 - Unfunded Mandates, 
104th Cong., 1st sess., January 5, 1995, S.Hrg. 104-392 (Washington: GPO, 1995), pp. 90-107. 
25 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Unfunded Mandates: Views Vary About Reform Act’s Strengths, 
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example, on April 28, 1994, Governor (now Senator) Benjamin Nelson, testifying on behalf of the 
National Governors Association at a congressional hearing on unfunded mandate legislation, 
argued, 
At the outset, Mr. Chairman, I want to make it absolutely crystal clear that the Governors’ 
position opposing unfunded environmental mandates must not be interpreted as an effort to 
discontinue environmental legislation and regulations or oppose any individual’s civil or 
constitutional rights. The Governors consider the protection of public health and State 
natural resources as among the most important responsibilities of our office. We all take an 
oath of office to protect the health and safety of our citizens. In addition, we have worked 
with Congress over the years to enact strong Federal environmental laws.26 
Total and Partial Statutory Preemptions 
Total and partial preemptions of state and local spending and regulatory authority by the federal 
government are compulsory, but there was, and continues to be, disagreement concerning whether 
they should be considered federal mandates, or whether they should be included in legislation 
designed to provide relief from unfunded federal mandates. Total preemptions in the 
intergovernmental arena prevent state and local government officials from implementing their 
own programs in a policy area. For example, states have been “stripped of their powers to engage 
in economic regulation of airlines, bus, and trucking companies, to establish a compulsory 
retirement age for their employees other than specified state policymakers and judges, or to 
regulate bankruptcies with the exception of the establishment of a homestead exemption.”27 
Partial preemption typically is a joint enterprise, “whereby the federal government exerts its 
constitutional authority to preempt a field and establish minimum national standards, but allows 
regulatory administration to be delegated to the states if they adopt standards at least as strict as 
the federal rules.”28 Legally, the state decision to administer a partial preemption program is 
voluntary. States that do not have a program in a particular area or do not wish to assume the 
costs of administration and enforcement can opt out and allow the federal government to enforce 
the standards.29 Nonetheless, the federal standards apply. 
Total and partial statutory preemptions are distinct from unfunded federal intergovernmental 
mandates because they do not necessarily impose costs or require state and local governments to 
take action. Nonetheless, some federalism scholars and state and local government officials have 
argued that total and partial statutory preemptions should be included in legislation placing 
conditions on the imposition of unfunded federal mandates because they can have similar adverse 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
Weaknesses, and Options for Improvement, GAO-05-454, March 31, 2005, pp. 9, 13, 14, at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d05454.pdf. 
26 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Federal Mandate Reform Legislation, 103rd Cong., 2nd 
sess., April 28, 1994, S.Hrg. 103-1019 (Washington: GPO, 1995), p. 7. 
27 Joseph F. Zimmerman, “National-State Relations: Cooperative Federalism in the Twentieth Century,” Publius: The 
Journal of Federalism, vol. 31, no. 2 (Spring 2001), p. 23. 
28 ACIR, Federally Induced Costs Affecting State and Local Governments, M-193 (Washington, DC: ACIR, 1994), p. 
22. 
29 Ibid., p. 23. 
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effects on state and local government flexibilities and, in some instances, resources.30 A leading 
federalism scholar identified 557 federal preemption statutes as of 2005.31 
Others argue that total and partial preemptions are distinct from unfunded federal mandates and, 
therefore, should not be included in legislation placing conditions on the imposition of unfunded 
federal mandates. In addition, some business organizations oppose including preemptions in any 
law or definition involving unfunded federal mandates because federal preemptions can result in 
the standardization of regulation across state and local jurisdictions, an outcome favored by some 
business interests, particularly those with interstate and global operations.32 
Grant-in-Aid Conditions 
Conditions of grants-in-aid are generally not considered unfunded mandates because the costs 
they impose on state and local governments can be avoided by refusing the grant. However, 
federalism scholars and state and local government officials have argued that, in the absence of 
sufficient compensatory funding, grant conditions should be considered unfunded federal 
intergovernmental mandates, even though the grants themselves are voluntary.33 In their view, 
federal “grants often require major commitments of state resources, changes in state laws, and 
even constitutional provisions to conform to a host of federal policy and administrative 
requirements” and that some grant programs, such as Medicaid, are “too large for state and local 
governments to voluntarily turn down, or when new and onerous conditions are added some time 
after state and local governments have become dependent on the program.”34 For example, on 
April 28, 1994, Patrick Sweeney, a Democratic member of Ohio’s state House of Representatives 
testifying on behalf of the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), asserted at a 
congressional hearing on unfunded mandate legislation that 
A great majority of the current problem can be attributed to Federal entitlements that are 
defined but then not adequately funded, and the proliferation of a mandatory requirement for 
what previously were voluntary programs. Programs like Medicaid are voluntary in theory 
only. A State cannot unilaterally opt out of Medicaid at any time it wishes, once it is in the 
program, without having to obtain a Federal waiver or face certain lawsuits.35  
                                                 
30 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Unfunded Mandates: Views Vary About Reform Act’s Strengths, 
Weaknesses, and Options for Improvement, GAO-05-454, March 31, 2005, pp. 5, 11, 12, 23, 38, 39, 43, 47, 48, at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05454.pdf. 
31 Joseph F. Zimmerman, “Congressional Preemption During the George W. Bush Administration,” Publius: The 
Journal of Federalism, vol. 37, no. 3 (Summer 2007), p. 436. 
32 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Unfunded Mandates: Views Vary About Reform Act’s Strengths, 
Weaknesses, and Options for Improvement, GAO-05-454, March 31, 2005, p. 12, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d05454.pdf; and Paul L. Posner, “The Politics of Preemption: Prospects for the States,” PS (July 2005), p. 372. 
33 Paul L. Posner, “Mandates: The Politics of Coercive Federalism,” in Intergovernmental Management for the 21st 
Century, eds. Timothy J. Conlan and Paul L. Posner (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), p. 287; and 
Paul L. Posner, The Politics of Unfunded Mandates: Whither Federalism? (Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 1998), pp. 4, 12-14. 
34 Paul L. Posner, The Politics of Unfunded Mandates: Whither Federalism? (Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 1998), pp. 12, 13. See also, Joseph F. Zimmerman, “Federally Induced State and Local Government Costs,” 
paper delivered at the 1991 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 
September 1, 1991, p. 4. 
35 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Federal Mandate Reform Legislation, 103rd Cong., 2nd 
sess., April 28, 1994, S.Hrg. 103-1019 (Washington: GPO, 1995), p. 11. 
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Federal Tax Provisions 
Federalism scholars and state and local government officials argue that federal tax policies that 
preempt state and local authority to tax specific activities or entities are unfunded mandates, and 
should be covered under legislation placing restrictions on unfunded mandates, because the fiscal 
impact of preempting state or local government revenue sources cannot be avoided and “can be 
every bit as costly” as mandates ordering state or local government action.36 For example, the 
Internet Tax Freedom Act Amendments Act of 2007 extended the moratorium on internet taxation 
through November 1, 2014.37 The NCSL has estimated that states could receive an additional 
$23.3 billion annually in state sales tax revenue if the moratorium were lifted.38 
In addition, because most state and local income taxes have been designed purposively to 
conform to federal tax law, changes in federal tax policy can impact state and local government 
finances. For example, federal tax cuts adopted in 2001 and 2003 affecting depreciation, 
dividends, and estate taxes “forced states to acquiesce and accept their consequences or decouple 
from the federal tax base.”39 Yet, federal tax changes are generally considered not to be unfunded 
mandates because states and localities can avoid their costs by decoupling their income tax from 
the federal income tax. Nevertheless, because federal tax changes can affect state and local 
government tax bases, most state and local government officials advocate their inclusion in 
federal legislation placing conditions on the imposition of unfunded federal mandates. 
Federal Court Decisions; Administrative Rules Issued by Federal Agencies; 
and Regulatory Delays and Non-enforcement 
Federalism scholars, state and local government officials, and other organizations argue that, in 
the absence of sufficient compensatory funding, court decisions and regulatory actions taken by 
federal agencies, including regulatory delays and non-enforcement, are unfunded mandates and 
should be included in legislation placing conditions on the imposition of unfunded mandates 
because these actions can impose costs on state and local governments that cannot be avoided. 
UMRA’s provisions concerning administrative rules are discussed in greater detail later in this 
report (see the section on “UMRA and Federal Rulemaking (Title II)”). 
UMRA’s Definition of an Unfunded Federal Mandate 
After taking various definitions into consideration, Congress defined federal mandates in UMRA 
more narrowly than state and local government officials had hoped. Federal intergovernmental 
mandates were defined as any provision in legislation, statute, or regulation that “would impose 
an enforceable duty upon State, local, or tribal governments” or “reduce or eliminate the amount” 
                                                 
36 National Conference of State Legislatures, “Policy Position on Federal Mandate Relief,” effective through August 
2011, at http://www.ncsl.org/Default.aspx?TabID=773&tabs=855,20,632#FederalMandate; and Paul L. Posner, 
“Mandates: The Politics of Coercive Federalism,” in Intergovernmental Management for the 21st Century, eds. 
Timothy J. Conlan and Paul L. Posner (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), pp. 287, 292, 293. 
37 For further analysis, see CRS Report R41853, State Taxation of Internet Transactions, by Steven Maguire. 
38 National Conference of State Legislatures, “Collecting E-Commerce Taxes,” Washington, DC, at 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/budget/collecting-ecommerce-taxes-an-interactive-map.aspx. 
39 Paul L. Posner, “Mandates: The Politics of Coercive Federalism,” in Intergovernmental Management for the 21st 
Century, eds. Timothy J. Conlan and Paul L. Posner (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), p. 292. 
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of federal funding authorized to cover the costs of an existing mandate.40 Provisions in 
legislation, statute, or regulation that “would increase the stringency of conditions of assistance” 
or “would place caps upon, or otherwise decrease” federal funding for existing intergovernmental 
grants with annual entitlement authority of $500 million or more could also be considered a 
federal intergovernmental mandate, but only if the state, local, or tribal government “lack 
authority under that program to amend their financial or programmatic responsibilities to continue 
providing required services that are affected by the legislation, statute, or regulation.”41 
Private-sector mandates were defined as “any provision in legislation, statute, or regulation that 
would impose an enforceable duty upon the private sector” or “reduce or eliminate the amount” 
of federal funding authorized “for the purposes of ensuring compliance with such duty.”42  
Key words in both definitions are “enforceable duty.” Because statutory direct orders, total and 
partial preemptions, federal tax policies that preempt specific state and local tax policies, and 
administrative rules issued by federal agencies cannot be avoided, they are enforceable duties and 
are covered under UMRA. In contrast, because federal grants are voluntary, grant conditions are 
not considered enforceable duties and, therefore, are not covered under UMRA. Federal tax 
policies that impose costs on state and local governments that can be avoided by decoupling the 
state or local government’s affected income tax provision from the federal income tax code are 
not enforceable duties, and, therefore, also are not covered under UMRA. 
UMRA considers a mandate unfunded unless the legislation authorizing the mandate fully meets 
its estimated direct costs by either (1) providing new budget authority (direct spending authority 
or entitlement authority) or (2) authorizing appropriations. If appropriations are authorized, the 
mandate is still considered unfunded unless the legislation ensures that in any fiscal year, either 
(1) the actual costs of the mandate are estimated not to exceed the appropriations actually 
provided; (2) the terms of the mandate will be revised so that it can be carried out with the funds 
appropriated; (3) the mandate will be abolished; or (4) Congress will enact new legislation to 
continue the mandate as an unfunded mandate.43 This mechanism for reviewing and revising 
mandates on the basis of their actual costs, which was introduced into UMRA in the “Byrd look-
back amendment” (as described in Appendix A), applies only to intergovernmental mandates 
enacted in legislation as funded through appropriations. 
Exemptions and Exclusions 
UMRA generally excluded pre-existing federal mandates from its provisions, but, as mentioned 
previously, it did include any provision in legislation, statute, or regulation that “would increase 
the stringency of conditions of assistance” or “would place caps upon, or otherwise decrease” 
federal funding for existing intergovernmental grants with annual entitlement authority of $500 
million or more.44 However, this provision applies “only if the state or locality lacks authority to 
amend its financial or programmatic responsibilities to continue providing the required 
                                                 
40 2 U.S.C. §658(5)(A). 
41 2 U.S.C. §658(5)(B). 
42 2 U.S.C. §658(7)(A) and 2 U.S.C. §658(7)(B). 
43 2 U.S.C. §658d(a)(2); §425 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, as amended, P.L. 
93-344, 88 Stat. 297, 2 U.S.C. §658 et seq. 
44 2 U.S.C. §658(5)(B). 
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services.”45 Because CBO has determined that many large intergovernmental entitlement grant 
programs, such as Medicaid and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, “allow states 
significant flexibility to alter their programs and accommodate new requirements,” UMRA 
provisions have not been applied to them.46 
UMRA’s Title I does not apply to conditions of federal assistance; duties stemming from 
participation in voluntary federal programs; and legislative provisions that cover individual 
constitutional rights, discrimination, emergency assistance, grant accounting and auditing 
procedures, national security, treaty obligations, and certain parts of Social Security relating to the 
old-age, survivors, and disability insurance program under title II of the Social Security Act.47 
UMRA did not indicate that these exempted provisions and rules were not federal mandates. 
Instead, it established that their costs would not be subject to its provisions requiring written cost 
estimate statements, or to its provisions permitting a point of order to be raised against the 
consideration of reported legislation in which they appear. The Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs report accompanying S. 1, The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 
provided its reasoning for adopting the exempted provisions and rules: 
A number of these exemptions are standard in many pieces of legislation in order to 
recognize the domain of the President in foreign affairs and as Commander-in-Chief as well 
as to ensure that Congress’s and the Executive Branch’s hands are not tied with procedural 
requirements in times of national emergencies. Further, the Committee thinks that Federal 
auditing, accounting and other similar requirements designed to protect Federal funds from 
potential waste, fraud, and abuse should be exempt from the Act. 
The Committee recognizes the special circumstances and history surrounding the enactment 
and enforcement of Federal civil rights laws. During the middle part of the 20th century, the 
arguments of those who opposed the national, uniform extension of basic equal rights, 
protection, and opportunity to all individuals were based on a States rights philosophy. With 
the passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
Congress rejected that argument out of hand as designed to thwart equal opportunity and to 
protect discriminatory, unjust and unfair practices in the treatment of individuals in certain 
parts of the country. The Committee therefore exempts Federal civil rights laws from the 
requirements of this Act.48 
In addition, as will be discussed in the next section, UMRA does not require all legislative 
provisions that contain federal mandates, even those that contain mandates that meet UMRA’s 
definition, to have a CBO written cost estimate statement. In some instances, CBO may 
determine that cost estimates may not be feasible or complete. In addition, UMRA only requires 
estimates of direct costs imposed by the legislation. Estimates of indirect, secondary costs, such 
                                                 
45 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, Work, Opportunity, and Responsibility for Kids Act, report to 
accompany H.R. 4737, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., July 25, 2002, S.Rept. 107-221 (Washington: GPO, 2002), p. 61; and 2 
U.S.C. §658(5)(B). 
46 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, Work, Opportunity, and Responsibility for Kids Act, report to 
accompany H.R. 4737, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., July 25, 2002, S.Rept. 107-221 (Washington: GPO, 2002), p. 61. 
47 2 U.S.C. §658a. 
48 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995, report to 
accompany S. 1, 104th Cong., 1st sess., January 11, 1995, S.Rept. 104-1 (Washington: GPO, 1995), p. 12. 
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as effects on prices and wages when the costs of a mandate imposed on one party are passed on to 
others, such as customers or employees, are not required.49 
UMRA and Congressional Procedure (Title I) 
UMRA’s Procedures 
Under Title I, which took effect on January 1, 1996, CBO was directed, to the extent practicable, 
to assist congressional committees, upon their request, in analyzing the budgetary and financial 
impact of any proposed legislation that may have (1) a significant budgetary impact on state, 
local, and tribal governments; (2) a significant financial impact on the private sector; or (3) a 
significant employment impact on the private sector. In addition, CBO was directed, if asked by a 
committee chair or committee ranking minority Member, to conduct a study, to the extent 
practicable, of the budgetary and financial impact of proposed legislation containing a federal 
mandate. If reasonably feasible, the study is to include estimates of the future direct costs of the 
federal mandate “to the extent that such costs significantly differ from or extend beyond the 5-
year period after the mandate is first effective.”50 
While the actions noted above are technically discretionary, UMRA does contain mandatory 
directives. When an authorizing committee reports a public bill or joint resolution containing a 
federal mandate, UMRA requires the committee to provide the measure to CBO for budgetary 
analysis.51 CBO is required to provide the committee a cost estimate statement of a mandate’s 
direct costs if those costs are estimated to equal or exceed predetermined amounts, adjusted for 
inflation, in any of the first five fiscal years the legislation would be in effect. In 2013, those 
threshold amounts are $75 million for intergovernmental mandates and $150 million for private-
sector mandates. CBO is also required to inform the committee if the mandate has estimated 
direct costs below these thresholds and briefly explain the basis of the estimate. 
CBO must also identify any increase in federal appropriations or other spending that has been 
provided to fund the mandate.52 The federal mandate is considered unfunded unless estimated 
costs are fully funded. As described above, under “UMRA’s Definition of an Unfunded Federal 
Mandate,” UMRA provides that mandate costs be considered as funded only if the legislation 
covers the mandate costs either by providing new direct spending or entitlement authority or by 
authorizing appropriations and incorporating a mechanism to provide for the mandate to be 
revised or abolished if the requisite appropriations are not provided. 
Direct costs for intergovernmental mandates are defined as “the aggregate estimated amounts that 
all State, local and tribal governments would be required to spend or would be prohibited from 
raising in revenues in order to comply with the Federal intergovernmental mandate.”53 Direct 
costs for federal private-sector mandates are defined as “the aggregate estimated amounts that the 
                                                 
49 U.S. General Accounting Office, Unfunded Mandates: Analysis of Reform Act Coverage, GAO-04-637, May 12, 
2004, pp. 11-17, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04637.pdf. 
50 2 U.S.C. §602. 
51 2 U.S.C. §658b. 
52 2 U.S.C. §658c. 
53 2 U.S.C. §658 (3)(A)(i). 
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private sector will be required to spend in order to comply with the Federal private sector 
mandate.”54  
To accomplish these tasks, CBO created the State and Local Government Cost Estimates Unit 
within its Budget Analysis Division to prepare intergovernmental mandate cost estimate 
statements as well as other analysis and special studies on the budgetary effects of mandates. It 
also added new staff to its program analysis divisions to prepare private-sector mandate cost 
estimate statements.55 
A congressional committee is required to include the CBO estimate of mandate costs in its report 
on the bill. If the mandate cost estimate is not available, or if the report is not expected to be in 
print before the legislation reaches the floor for consideration, the committee is to publish the 
mandate cost estimate in the Congressional Record in advance of floor consideration. In addition 
to identifying direct costs, the committee’s report must also assess the likely costs and benefits of 
any mandates in the legislation, describe how they affect the competitive balance between the 
private and public sectors, state the extent to which the legislation would preempt state, local, or 
tribal law, and explain the effect of any preemption. For intergovernmental mandates alone, the 
committee is to describe in its report the extent to which the legislation authorizes federal funding 
for direct costs of the mandate, and detail whether and how funding is to be provided.56 
CBO Cost Estimate Statements 
CBO has submitted 9,879 estimates of mandate costs to Congress from January 1, 1996, when 
UMRA’s Title I became effective, to December 12, 2013 (see Table 1). Each of these statements 
examined the mandate costs imposed on the private sector or state, local, and tribal governments 
by provisions in a specific bill, amendment, or conference report. About 12.6% of these cost 
estimate statements (1,249 of 9,879 cost estimate statements) identified costs imposed by 
intergovernmental mandates, and 1.0% of them (98 of 9,879 cost estimate statements) identified 
intergovernmental mandates that exceeded UMRA’s threshold. CBO was unable to determine 
costs imposed by intergovernmental mandates in 75 bills, amendments, or conference reports. 




















104th (1996) 718 69 11 6 
105th (1997-1998) 1,062 128 14 14 
106th (1999-2000) 1,279 158 7 1 
                                                 
54 2 U.S.C. §658 (3)(B). 
55 Theresa A. Gullo and Janet M. Kelly, “Federal Unfunded Mandate Reform: A First-Year Retrospective,” Public 
Administration Review, vol. 58, no. 5 (September/October 1998), p. 381. 
56 2 U.S.C. §658c(a). 
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107th (2001-2002) 1,038 110 10 8 
108th (2003-2004) 1,172 152 16 7 
109th (2005-2006) 978 171 18 6 
110th (2007-2008) 1,382 168 7 6 
111th (2009-2010) 893 134 11 19 
112th (2011-2012) 864 124 4 8 
113th (2013-December 12, 2013) 493 35 0 0 
Total 9,879 1,249 98 75 
Sources: U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Cost Estimates,” December 12, 2013, at http://www.cbo.gov/
search/ce_sitesearch.cfm; U.S. Congressional Budget Office, A Review of CBO’s Activities in 2012 Under the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, March 2013, p. 4; U.S. Congressional Budget Office, A Review of CBO’s Activities in 
2010 Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, March 2011, p. 6; U.S. Congressional Budget Office, A Review of 
CBO’s Activities in 2008 Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, March 2009, p. 21; and U.S. Congressional 
Budget Office, A Review of CBO’s Activities Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 1996 to 2005, March 2006, p. 
4. 
Notes: CBO began preparing mandate statements in January 1996. The figures for the 104th Congress reflect 
bills on the legislative calendar in January 1996 and bills reported by authorizing committees thereafter. 
CBO has submitted 9,757 estimates to Congress that examined private-sector mandate costs 
imposed by provisions in a specific bill, amendment, or conference report from January 1, 1996, 
when UMRA’s Title I became effective, to December 12, 2013 (see Table 2) . The number of 
statements transmitted to Congress shown in Table 2 is less than the number shown in Table 1 
because CBO is sometimes asked to review a specific bill, amendment, or conference report 
solely for intergovernmental mandates. 














CBO Unable to 
Determine 
Mandate Costs 
104th (1996) 673 91 38 2 
105th (1997-1998) 1,023 140 36 14 
106th (1999-2000) 1,253 191 26 20 
107th (2001-2002) 1,034 139 37 22 
108th (2003-2004) 1,168 171 38 28 
109th (2005-2006) 974 184 45 32 
110th (2007-2008) 1,382 256 67 49 
111th (2009-2010) 893 190 41 50 
112th (2011-2012) 864 147 40 35 
113th (2013-December 12, 2013) 493 49 12 2 
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CBO Unable to 
Determine 
Mandate Costs 
Total 9,757 1,558 380 254 
Source: U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Cost Estimates,” December 12, 2013, at http://www.cbo.gov/search/
ce_sitesearch.cfm; U.S. Congressional Budget Office, A Review of CBO’s Activities in 2012 Under the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act, March 2013, p. 4; U.S. Congressional Budget Office, A Review of CBO’s Activities in 2010 
Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, March 2011, p. 6; U.S. Congressional Budget Office, A Review of CBO’s 
Activities in 2008 Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, March 2009, p. 21; and U.S. Congressional Budget 
Office, A Review of CBO’s Activities Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 1996 to 2005, March 2006, p. 4. 
Notes: CBO began preparing mandate statements in January 1996. The figures for the 104th Congress reflect 
bills on the legislative calendar in January 1996 and bills reported by authorizing committees thereafter. In some 
years, CBO transmitted more cost estimate statements for intergovernmental mandates than private-sector 
mandates because sometimes CBO was asked to review a specific bill, amendment, or conference report solely 
for intergovernmental mandates. 
About 16.0% of these private-sector estimates (1,558 of 9,757 cost estimate statements) identified 
costs imposed by mandates, and about 3.9% of them (380 of 9,757 cost estimate statements) 
identified costs that exceeded UMRA’s threshold. CBO was unable to determine costs imposed by 
private-sector mandates in 254 bills, amendments, or conference reports. 
Points of Order for Initial Consideration 
UMRA provides for the enforcement of its informational requirements on legislation by 
establishing a point of order in each chamber against consideration of a measure on which the 
reporting committee has not published the required estimate of mandate costs. This point of order 
applies only to measures reported by committees (for which CBO estimates of mandate costs are 
required), but it applies for both intergovernmental and private-sector mandates. In addition, 
however, if the informational requirement is met, a point of order against consideration of a 
measure may still be raised, if, for any fiscal year, the estimated total mandate cost of unfunded 
intergovernmental mandates in the measure exceeds UMRA’s threshold amount ($75 million in 
2013). This point of order may be raised also if CBO reported that no reasonable estimate of the 
cost of intergovernmental mandates was feasible.57 
Uniquely among the requirements established by UMRA, this substantive point of order 
addressing intergovernmental mandates contained in legislation constitutes a potential means of 
control over the actual imposition of mandate costs. Even in this case, however, the mechanisms 
established by UMRA provide a means of controlling mandates only on the basis of estimates of 
the costs that will be incurred in subsequent fiscal years. The only provision of UMRA that offers 
a possibility of controls based on costs actually incurred by affected entities is the requirement, 
mentioned earlier, that a mandate can be considered funded through appropriations only if it 
directs that, if insufficient appropriations are made, the mandate must be revised, abolished, or 
reenacted as unfunded. 
In several respects, the applicability of the substantive point of order differs from that of the 
informational point of order. First, it applies to any measure coming to the floor for consideration, 
                                                 
57 2 U.S.C. §658d(a); and 2 U.S.C. §658c(b)(3). 
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whether or not reported by a committee, and also to conference reports. For a measure that has 
been reported, this point of order applies to the measure in the form reported, including, for 
example, to a committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. In addition, this point of order 
applies against an amendment or motion (such as a motion to recommit with amendatory 
instructions), and does so on the basis not that the mandate costs of the amendment or motion 
itself exceeds the threshold, but that the amendment or motion would cause the total mandate 
costs in the measure to do so. Finally, however, this point of order applies only against 
intergovernmental mandates. UMRA imposes no comparable control in relation to private-sector 
mandates. 
Because federal mandates are created through authorization bills, the UMRA points of order 
generally do not apply to bills reported by the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations. 
However, if an appropriation bill, resolution, amendment, or conference report contains 
legislative provisions that would either increase the direct costs of a federal intergovernmental 
mandate that exceeds the threshold, or cause those costs to exceed the threshold, a point of order 
may be raised against the provisions themselves. In the Senate, if this point of order is sustained, 
the provisions are stricken from the bill.58 
In the House, the chair does not rule on a point of order raised under these provisions. Instead, the 
House, by majority vote, determines whether to consider the measure despite the point of order. 
To prevent dilatory use of the point of order, the chair need not put the question of consideration 
to a vote unless the Member making the point of order meets the “threshold burden” of 
identifying specific language that is claimed to contain the unfunded mandate. Also, if several 
points of order could be raised against the same measure, House practices under UMRA allow all 
of them to be disposed of at once by a single vote on consideration. If the Committee on Rules 
proposes a special rule for considering the measure that waives the point of order, UMRA 
subjects the special rule itself to a point of order, which is disposed of by the same mechanism.59 
In the Senate, if questions are raised challenging the applicability of an UMRA point of order 
(e.g., to prevent its use for dilatory purposes), the presiding officer, to the extent practicable, 
consults with the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs to determine if the 
measure contains an intergovernmental mandate and with the Senate Committee on the Budget to 
determine if the mandate’s direct costs meet UMRA’s threshold for allowing a point of order to be 
raised. The Senate Committee on the Budget may draw for this purpose on CBO cost estimate 
statements. If there are no such challenges, or the presiding officer rules against the challenge, the 
Senate determines whether to consider the measure despite the point of order. It may do so by 
voting on a motion to waive the point of order.60 
Initially, a majority vote was sufficient to waive the point of order in the Senate.61 In 2005, the 
Senate increased its threshold to waive an UMRA point of order to three-fifths of Senators duly 
chosen and sworn (normally 60 votes), as was already required of many other Budget Act points 
of order. Two UMRA points of order were raised in the Senate that year, and both were sustained, 
defeating two amendments to an appropriations bill that would have increased the minimum wage 
                                                 
58 2 U.S.C. §658d(c). 
59 2 U.S.C. §658e(a); and 2 U.S.C. §658e(b)(3). 
60 2 U.S.C. §658d(d); and 2 U.S.C. §658d(e). 
61 2 U.S.C. §558d(a); §403(b)(1) of H.Con.Res. 95, adopted April 28, 2005. 
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(see Table 3). In 2007, the Senate returned its threshold for waiving an UMRA point of order to a 
majority vote.62  
On April 2, 2009, the Senate approved, by unanimous consent, an amendment (S.Amdt. 819) to 
S.Con.Res. 13, the concurrent budget resolution for FY2010, which would have again increased 
the vote necessary in the Senate to waive an UMRA point of order to three-fifths of Senators duly 
chosen and sworn (normally 60 votes). The amendment was subsequently dropped in the final 
version of the concurrent budget resolution for FY2010. 
On March 23, 2013, the Senate agreed, by voice vote, to an amendment (S.Amdt. 538) to 
S.Con.Res. 8, the concurrent budget resolution for FY2014, which would have restored the 
requirement for waiving an UMRA point of order in the Senate to three-fifths of the full Senate 
(normally 60 votes). S.Con.Res. 8 was received in the House on April 15, 2013, and held at the 
desk. Because the House has not acted on the measure, and no other legislation on the matter has 
been approved by Congress, the simple majority requirement for appealing or waiving UMRA 
points of order in the Senate remains in effect. 
A scholar familiar with UMRA has argued that, inasmuch as the general floor procedures of the 
Senate already allowed Senators to force a majority vote on a mandate by moving to strike it from 
the bill, UMRA’s enforcement procedure of waiving a point of order by majority vote meant that 
UMRA mattered only in the House.63 As evidence of this, the scholar noted that during UMRA’s 
first 10 years of operation, when the threshold to waive an UMRA point of order was a majority 
vote in both the House and Senate, 13 UMRA points of order were raised, all in the House (see 
Table 3). 




in the House 
Points of Order  
Sustained in 
the House 
Points of Order 
Raised in the 
Senate 
Points of Order 
Sustained in 
the Senate 
104th (1996) 3 1 0 0 
105th (1997-1998) 4 0 0 0 
106th (1999-2000) 4 0 0 0 
107th (2001-2002) 2 0 0 0 
108th (2003-2004) 0 0 0 0 
109th (2005-2006) 6 0 2 2 
110th (2007-2008) 8 0 0 0 
111th (2009-2010) 13 0 1 0 
112th (2011-2012) 10 0 0 0 
113th (2013-December 12, 2013) 3 0 0 0 
Total 53 1 3 2 
                                                 
62 2 U.S.C. §558d(a). 
63 Elizabeth Garrett, “Framework Legislation and Federalism,” Notre Dame Law Review, vol. 83, no. 4 (2008), p. 1502. 
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Source: Congressional Record, various years. A list of UMRA points of order raised to date is provided in 
Appendix B. 
As indicated in Table 3, 53 UMRA points of order have been raised in the House. Only one of 
these points of order, the first one, which was raised on March 28, 1996, in opposition to a 
proposal to add a minimum wage increase to the Contract With America Advancement Act of 
1996, resulted in the House voting to reject consideration of a proposed provision. During the 
111th, 112th, and 113th Congresses, to date, UMRA points of order in the House have often been 
raised not to challenge unfunded federal mandates per se, but to use the 10 minutes of debate 
allowed each House Member initiating an UMRA point of order to challenge the pace of 
legislative consideration, limitations on the offering of amendments to appropriations bills, or the 
inclusion of earmarks in legislation.64 
Also, as indicated in Table 3, UMRA points of order have been raised in the Senate three times. 
In 2005, points of order were raised against two amendments relating to an increase in the 
minimum wage. In each case the Senate declined to waive the point of order, and the chair ruled 
that the amendment was out of order because it contained unfunded intergovernmental mandates 
in excess of the threshold.65 In 2009, an UMRA point of order was raised against 
intergovernmental mandates in a health care reform bill.66 The Senate voted to waive the point of 
order, 55-44.67 The Senate subsequently approved the bill with the mandates.68 
Impact on the Enactment of Statutory Intergovernmental and 
Private-Sector Mandates 
Although UMRA points of order have been sustained just three times, most state and local 
government officials assert that UMRA has reduced “the number of unfunded federal mandates 
by acting as a deterrent to their enactment.”69 For example, in 2001, Raymond Scheppach, then-
NGA’s executive director, testified before a House subcommittee that UMRA had slowed the 
growth of unfunded mandates and improved communications between federal policymakers and 
state and local government officials: 
Direct mandates have declined sharply in the wake of the Act. But I would venture that 
UMRA has had an even greater intangible benefit. As Congressman Portman once told us, he 
was certain this would be one of those bills that he could frame and hang on his wall, and it 
would become just another relic of history. But, to his surprise, the Act has led – time and 
                                                 
64 Based on CRS review of the 24 points of order raised in the House during the 111th, 112th, and 113th Congresses, to 
date. 
65 “Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and 
Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006,” proceedings in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 
151 (October 19, 2005), pp. S11526, S11547-S11548. 
66 Senator Robert Corker, “H.R. 3590, the Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009,” remarks in the 
Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 155, no. 199 (December 23, 2009), pp. S13803, S13804. 
67 “Consideration of H.R. 3590, the Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009, Senate Rollcall Vote No. 
390,” Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 155, no. 199 (December 23, 2009), p. S13831. 
68 “Consideration of H.R. 3590, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Senate Rollcall Vote No. 396,” 
Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 155, no. 201 (December 24, 2009), p. S13831. 
69 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Unfunded Mandates: Views Vary About Reform Act’s Strengths, 
Weaknesses, and Options for Improvement, GAO-05-454, March 31, 2005, p. 15, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d05454.pdf. 
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again—to members asking his advice: “Do you think this bill will cause an UMRA problem? 
With whom should I work?” The very threat of a CBO report has engendered efforts to reach 
out to state and local leaders before the fact—instead of after. It has changed the nature of 
our intergovernmental discussion in a very positive way.70 
More recently, NCSL has argued that UMRA has brought increased attention to the fiscal effects 
of federal legislation on state and local governments, improved federal accountability, and 
enhanced consultation.71 In addition, there have been documented instances in which either 
sponsors of legislation have modified provisions to avoid a CBO statement that unfunded 
intergovernmental mandate costs exceeded the threshold, or measures with such costs estimated 
to exceed the threshold were altered prior to floor consideration to reduce their costs below the 
threshold.72 
As mentioned previously, since UMRA’s Title I became effective in 1996, CBO has submitted 
9,879 written cost estimate statements to Congress that examined the costs imposed by provisions 
in a specific bill, amendment, or conference report on the private sector and state and local 
governments. It identified intergovernmental mandates in 1,249 of them (12.6%). CBO also 
reported in March 2013 that, “only 13 laws containing intergovernmental mandates with costs 
estimated to exceed the statutory threshold have been enacted since UMRA became effective in 
1996.”73 Those laws are as follows: 
• Two increases in the minimum wage—P.L. 104-188, the Small Business Job 
Protection Act of 1996, enacted in 1996, was estimated to cost state and local 
governments more than $1 billion during the first five years that it was in effect. 
P.L. 110-28, the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and 
Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, enacted in 2007, was estimated to 
cost state and local governments slightly less than $1 billion during the first five 
years that it was in effect. 
• A reduction in federal funding for administering the food stamp program, now 
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, P.L. 105-185, the Agricultural 
Research, Extension, and Education Reform Act of 1998, enacted in 1998, was 
estimated to cost states between $200 million and $300 million annually. 
• Preemption of state taxes on premiums for certain prescription drug plans, P.L. 
108-73, the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Relief Act of 2003, enacted in 2003, was 
estimated to cost states $70 million in revenue in 2006, the first year it was in 
effect, and increase to about $95 million annually by 2010. 
                                                 
70 Joint Hearing, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural 
Resources and Regulatory Affairs, and House Committee on Rules, Subcommittee on Technology and the House, 
Unfunded Mandates: A Five Year Review and Recommendations for Change, hearing on the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act of 1995, 107th Cong., 1st sess., May 24, 2001, H. Hrg. 107-19 (Washington: GPO, 2001), p. 61. 
71 National Conference of State Legislatures, “State and Federal Budgeting: Federal Mandate Relief,” at 
http://www.ncsl.org/state-federal-committees.aspx?tabs=855,20,632. 
72 Paul L. Posner, “Unfunded Mandates Reform Act: 1996 and Beyond,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 27, 
no. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 57-59; U.S. General Accounting Office, Unfunded Mandates: Analysis of Reform Act 
Coverage, GAO-04-637, May 12, 2004, p. 19, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04637.pdf; and U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, Unfunded Mandates: Views Vary About Reform Act’s Strengths, Weaknesses, and Options for 
Improvement, GAO-05-454, March 31, 2005, p. 15, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05454.pdf. 
73 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, A Review of CBO’s Activities in 2012 Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 
March 2013, pp. 5, 52, 53, at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44032_UMRA.pdf. 
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• The temporary preemption of states’ authority to tax certain Internet services and 
transactions, P.L. 108-435, the Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act, enacted in 
2004, was estimated to reduce state and local government tax revenue by at least 
$300 million; the extension of this preemption in P.L. 110-108, the Internet Tax 
Freedom Act Amendments Act of 2007, enacted in 2007, was estimated to reduce 
state and local government tax revenue by about $80 million annually. 
• The requirement that state and local governments meet certain standards for 
issuing driver’s licenses, identification cards, and vital statistics documents, P.L. 
108-458, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, enacted 
in 2004, was estimated to cost state and local governments more than $100 
million over 2005-2009, with costs exceeding the threshold in at least one of 
those years. 
• The elimination of matching federal payments for some child support spending, 
P.L. 109-171, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, enacted in 2006, was estimated 
to cost states more than $100 million annually beginning in 2008. 
• The requirement that state and local governments withhold taxes on certain 
payments for property and services, P.L. 109-222, the Tax Increase Prevention 
and Reconciliation Act of 2005, enacted in 2006, was estimated to cost state and 
local governments more than $70 million annually beginning in 2011. 
• Requirements on rail and transit owners and operators to train workers and 
submit reports to the Department of Homeland Security, P.L. 110-53, the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, enacted in 
2007, was estimated to cost state and local governments more than UMRA’s 
threshold in at least one of the first five years following enactment. 
• The requirement that commuter railroads install train-control technology, P.L. 
110-432, the Railroad Safety Enhancement Act of 2008, enacted in 2008, was 
estimated to cost state and local governments more than UMRA’s threshold in at 
least one of the first five years following enactment. 
• The requirement that public entities that handle health insurance information 
comply with new regulations; health insurance plans pay an annual fee based on 
average number of people covered by the policy; public employers pay an excise 
tax on employer-sponsored health insurance coverage defined as having high 
costs; health insurance plans comply with new standards for extending coverage; 
and public entities must comply with new notice and reporting requirements on 
health insurance plans, P.L. 111-148, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, enacted in 2010, was estimated to have costs for state and local governments 
that would greatly exceed UMRA’s thresholds in each of the first five years 
following enactment. 
• The requirement that schools provide meals that comply with new standards for 
menu planning and nutrition and with nutrition standards for all food sold in 
schools, P.L. 111-296, the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, enacted in 
2010, was estimated to have costs for state and local governments that would 
exceed UMRA’s threshold beginning the first year that the mandates take effect.74 
                                                 
74 Ibid.; U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Selected CBO Publications Related to Health Care Legislation, 2009-2010, 
(continued...) 
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State and local government interest groups argue that these statistics confirm UMRA’s 
effectiveness in serving as a deterrent to the enactment of new unfunded mandates that exceed 
UMRA’s threshold and meet UMRA’s definition of a federal mandate. However, they also argue 
that many mandates with costs below UMRA’s threshold, or that do not meet UMRA’s definition 
of a federal mandate, have been adopted since UMRA’s enactment.75 
CBO reports that from 2004 through 2012, 170 laws were enacted with at least one 
intergovernmental mandate as defined under UMRA. These laws imposed 328 mandates on state 
and local governments, with 15 of these mandates exceeding UMRA’s threshold, 14 with 
estimated costs that could not be determined, and 299 with estimated costs below the threshold. 
CBO also reported that hundreds of other laws had an effect on state and local government 
budgets, but those laws did not meet UMRA’s definition of a federal mandate.76 
As mentioned previously, CBO reported that it has submitted 9,757 cost estimate statements to 
Congress that examined the costs imposed by provisions in a specific bill, amendment, or 
conference report that might impact the private sector. It identified private-sector mandates in 
1,558 of them (16.0%). CBO also reported in March 2013 that since UMRA became effective, it 
“has identified 131 private-sector mandates in 89 public laws with costs estimated to exceed 
[UMRA’s] annual threshold.”77 CBO also indicated that more than half of these mandates 
involved taxes or fees.78 
CBO also reports that from 2004 through 2012, 241 laws were enacted with at least one private-
sector mandate as defined under UMRA. These laws imposed 565 mandates on the private sector, 
with 106 of these mandates exceeding UMRA’s threshold, 90 with estimated costs that could not 
be determined, and 369 with estimated costs below the threshold.79 
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December 2010, pp. 17, 18, 148, 166, at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/120xx/doc12033/12-23-
SelectedHealthcarePublications.pdf; and S.Rept. 111-178, Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, Estimated Costs 
and Unfunded Mandates. 
75 National Conference of State Legislatures, “State and Federal Budgeting: Federal Mandate Relief,” at 
http://www.ncsl.org/Default.aspx?TabID=773&tabs=855,20,632#FederalMandate.  
76 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, A Review of CBO’s Activities in 2008 Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 
March 2009, p. 48, at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/doc10058/03-31-UMRA.pdf; U.S. Congressional Budget 
Office, A Review of CBO’s Activities in 2010 Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, March 2011, p. 5, at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/121xx/doc12117/03-31-UMRA.pdf; U.S. Congressional Budget Office, A Review of 
CBO’s Activities in 2011 Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, March 2012, pp. 5-7, at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-30-UMRA.pdf; and U.S. Congressional Budget Office, A Review of CBO’s 
Activities in 2012 Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, March 2013, pp. 5-9, at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/
files/cbofiles/attachments/44032_UMRA.pdf. 
77 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, A Review of CBO’s Activities in 2012 Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 
March 2013, p. 54, at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44032_UMRA.pdf. 
78 Ibid. 
79 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, A Review of CBO’s Activities in 2008 Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 
March 2009, p. 48, at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/doc10058/03-31-UMRA.pdf; U.S. Congressional Budget 
Office, A Review of CBO’s Activities in 2010 Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, March 2011, p. 5, at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/121xx/doc12117/03-31-UMRA.pdf; U.S. Congressional Budget Office, A Review of 
CBO’s Activities in 2011 Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, March 2012, p. 8, at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-30-UMRA.pdf; and U.S. Congressional Budget Office, A Review of CBO’s 
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Congressional Issues for Title I 
Exemptions and Exclusions 
State and local government officials argue that UMRA’s exemptions and exclusions reduce its 
effectiveness in limiting the enactment of unfunded federal intergovernmental mandates. They 
argue that federal programs in the exempted and excluded areas can still result in the imposition 
of costs on state, local, and tribal governments. Also, because UMRA does not include these costs 
as “mandates,” they are exempt even from the requirement for CBO to estimate these costs. For 
example, in 2008, NCSL asserted that “although fewer than a dozen mandates have been enacted 
that exceed the threshold established in UMRA, Congress has shifted at least $131 billion in costs 
to states over the past five years” and that during the 110th Congress at least $31 billion in 
additional costs were imposed on states through new mandates.80 
To reduce these costs, NCSL has recommended that UMRA’s provisions on points of order and 
requirements for written cost estimate statements also apply to (1) all open-ended entitlement 
grant-in-aid programs, such as Medicaid, and legislative provisions that would cap or enforce a 
ceiling on the cost of federal participation in any entitlement or mandatory spending program; (2) 
new conditions of federal funding for existing federal grants and programs; (3) legislative 
provisions that reduce state revenues, especially when changes to the federal tax code are 
retroactive or otherwise provide states with little or no opportunity to prospectively address the 
impact of a change in federal law on state revenues; and (4) mandates that fail to exceed the 
statutory threshold only because they do not affect all states.81 
For the most part, business interests have generally supported state and local government officials 
in their efforts to broaden UMRA’s coverage of federal intergovernmental mandates. In perhaps 
the most extensive effort to obtain various viewpoints on UMRA, in 2005, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) held group meetings, individual interviews, and received written 
responses from 52 individuals and organizations, including academic centers and think tanks, 
businesses, federal agencies, public interest advocacy groups, and state and local governments, 
concerning unfunded mandates. GAO reported that UMRA’s coverage was the issue most 
frequently commented on by parties from all five sectors, including business, and that most of the 
parties representing business viewed UMRA’s relatively narrow coverage as a major weakness 
that leaves out many federal actions with potentially significant financial impacts on nonfederal 
parties.82 However, GAO also found that the business sector has “generally been in favor of 
                                                 
80 National Conference of State Legislatures, Mandate Monitor, vol. 6, no. 1 (April 8, 2008), p. 1. 
81 NCSL also advocates a revision of the definition of direct costs to capture and more accurately reflect the true costs 
to state governments of particular federal actions; requiring that mandate statements accompany appropriations bills; 
enactment of legislation that would require federal reimbursement, as long as the mandate exists, to state and local 
governments for costs imposed on them by any new federal mandates; restrictions regarding the preemption of state 
laws; repeal or modification of certain existing mandates; and a review of UMRA’s existing exclusions. See National 
Conference of State Legislatures, “State and Federal Budgeting: Federal Mandate Relief,” at http://www.ncsl.org/
Default.aspx?TabID=773&tabs=855,20,632#FederalMandate. 
82 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Unfunded Mandates: Views Vary About Reform Act’s Strengths, 
Weaknesses, and Options for Improvement, GAO-05-454, March 31, 2005, p. 9, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d05454.pdf. 
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federal preemptions for reasons such as standardizing regulation across state and local 
jurisdictions.”83 
Although GAO found that most of the parties it contacted viewed UMRA’s coverage of 
intergovernmental mandates as being too narrow, it also reported that some of the participants 
opposed an expansion of UMRA’s coverage: 
A few parties from the public interest sector and academic/think tank sectors considered 
some of the existing exclusions important or identified UMRA’s narrow scope as one of the 
act’s strengths.... Specifically, these parties argued in favor of maintaining UMRA’s 
exclusions or expanding them to include federal actions regarding public health, safety, 
environmental protection, workers’ rights, and the disabled.... [They also] focused on the 
importance of the existing exclusions, particularly those dealing with constitutional and 
statutory rights, such as those barring discrimination against various groups.84  
With respect to private-sector mandates in legislation, UMRA allows a point of order to be raised 
only if UMRA’s informational requirements are not met; that is, only if the committee reporting 
the measure fails to publish a CBO cost estimate statement of the private-sector mandate’s costs. 
Over the years, various business organizations, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, have 
advocated the extension of UMRA’s substantive point of order for intergovernmental mandates to 
the private sector, permitting a point of order to be raised against consideration of legislation that 
includes private-sector mandates with costs that exceed UMRA’s threshold.85 
The GAO report also noted that “parties primarily from the academic/think tank and state and 
local governments sectors ... noted that while much attention has been focused on the actual 
(direct) costs of mandates, it is important to consider the broader implications on affected 
nonfederal entities beyond direct costs, including indirect costs such as opportunity costs, forgone 
revenues, shifting priorities, and fiscal trade-offs.”86 
During the 112th Congress, several bills were introduced to broaden UMRA’s coverage. For 
example, H.R. 373, the Unfunded Mandates Information and Transparency Act of 2011 (as 
amended), and H.R. 4078, the Red Tape Reduction and Small Business Job Creation Act: Title IV, 
the Unfunded Mandates Information and Transparency Act of 2012, which was passed by the 
House on July 26, 2012, would have, among other things, broadened UMRA’s coverage to 
include assessments of indirect costs, such as foregone profits and costs passed onto consumers, 
as well as direct costs and, when requested by the chair or ranking Member of a committee, the 
prospective costs of legislation that would change conditions of federal financial assistance. 
These two bills, as well as H.R. 5818, the Mandate Prevention Act of 2010, would have also 
made private-sector mandates subject to a substantive point of order. H.R. 373, H.R. 4078, S. 
1189, the Unfunded Mandates Accountability Act of 2011, its companion bill in the House, H.R. 
                                                 
83 Ibid., p. 12. 
84 Ibid., pp. 9, 13-14. 
85 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Reform, S. 389 – The Unfunded Mandates Information Act, 
hearing on S. 389, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., June 3, 1998, S.Hrg. 105-664 (Washington: GPO, 1998), pp. 28-35. 
86 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Unfunded Mandates: Views Vary About Reform Act’s Strengths, 
Weaknesses, and Options for Improvement, GAO-05-454, March 31, 2005, pp. 22, 23, at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d05454.pdf. GAO also found that “parties across the sectors suggested that various forms of retrospective 
analysis are needed for evaluating federal mandates after they are implemented” and “parties in the academic/think tank 
sector suggested analyzing the benefits of federal mandates, when appropriate, not just costs.” 
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2964, and S. 1720, the Jobs Through Growth Act: Title VII, the Unfunded Mandates 
Accountability Act, would also have removed UMRA’s exemption for rules issued by most 
independent agencies.  
The UMRA provisions in H.R. 4078 were reintroduced on February 28, 2013, as H.R. 899, the 
Unfunded Mandates Information and Transparency Act of 2013, during the 113th Congress. On 
July 24, 2013, H.R. 899 was reported favorably, by a vote of 22-17, by the House Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform. 
UMRA and Federal Rulemaking (Title II) 
UMRA’s Title II, which became effective on March 22, 1995, generally requires federal agencies, 
unless otherwise prohibited by law, to prepare written statements that identify costs and benefits 
of a federal mandate to be imposed through the rulemaking process that may result in the 
expenditure by state, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of 
$100 million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year, before “promulgating any 
general notice of proposed rulemaking.”87 In 2013, the threshold for preparing a written statement 
is $150 million. These informational requirements for regulations, like the Title I cost estimate 
requirements for legislation, apply to both intergovernmental and private-sector mandates. Title II 
establishes no equivalent to the point of order mechanism in Title I through which either house 
can decline to consider legislation proposing covered unfunded intergovernmental mandates 
above the applicable threshold level. 
The written assessments that federal agencies are to prepare for their regulations must identify the 
law authorizing the rule and include a qualitative and quantitative assessment of anticipated costs 
and benefits, the share of costs to be borne by the federal government, and the disproportionate 
budgetary effects upon particular regions, state, local, or tribal governments, or particular 
segments of the private sector. Assessments must also include estimates of the effect on the 
national economy, descriptions of consultations with nonfederal government officials, and a 
summary of the evaluation of comments and concerns obtained throughout the promulgation 
process.88 Impacts of “any regulatory requirements” on small governments must be identified, 
notice must be given to those governments, and technical assistance must be provided.89 Also, 
federal agencies are required, to the extent permitted in law, to develop an “effective process to 
permit elected officers of State, local, and tribal governments (or their designated employees with 
authority to act on their behalf) to provide meaningful and timely input in the development of 
regulatory proposals containing significant Federal intergovernmental mandates.”90 UMRA also 
requires federal agencies to consider “a reasonable number” of regulatory alternatives and select 
the “least costly, most cost-effective or least burdensome alternative” that achieves the objectives 
of the rule.91 
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88 Ibid. 
89 2 U.S.C. §1533. 
90 2 U.S.C. §1534. 
91 2 U.S.C. §1535. 
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UMRA requires the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) director to collect the 
executive branch agencies’ written cost estimate statements and periodically forward copies to 
CBO’s director. It also directs OMB to establish pilot programs in at least two federal agencies to 
test innovative regulatory approaches to reduce regulatory burdens on small governments, and 
provide Congress a written annual report detailing compliance with the act by each agency for the 
preceding reporting period.92 OMB’s director has delegated these responsibilities to its Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). 
Most of these provisions were already in place when UMRA was adopted. For example, 
Executive Order 12866, issued in September 1993, required agencies to provide OIRA with 
assessments of the costs and benefits of all economically significant proposed rules (defined as 
having an annual impact on the economy of $100 million or more), including some rules that 
were not mandates; to identify regulatory alternatives and explain why the planned regulatory 
action is preferable to other alternatives; to issue regulations that were cost-effective and impose 
the least burden on society; and to seek the views of state, local, and tribal officials before 
imposing regulatory requirements that might significantly or uniquely affect them.93 
Title II’s Exemptions and Exclusions 
UMRA’s requirement for federal agencies to issue written cost estimate statements for mandates 
issued through the rulemaking process that may result in expenditures of $100 million or more 
(adjusted annually for inflation) by state and local governments, in the aggregate, or by the 
private sector, in any one year, is subject to the exemptions and exclusions that apply to 
legislative provisions (e.g., conditions of federal assistance, duties arising from participation in a 
voluntary federal program, constitutional rights of individuals etc.). UMRA’s requirements also 
do not apply (1) to provisions in rules issued by independent regulatory agencies; (2) if the 
agency is “otherwise prohibited by law” from considering estimates of costs in adopting the rule 
(e.g., under the Clean Air Act the primary air quality standards are health-based and the courts 
have affirmed that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is not to consider costs in 
determining air quality standards for ozone and particulate matter); or (3) to any rule for which 
the agency does not publish a general notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register.94 
GAO has found that about half of all final rules published in the Federal Register are published 
without a general notice of proposed rulemaking, including some rules with impacts over $100 
million annually.95 
                                                 
92 2 U.S.C. §1536-1538. 
93 U.S. General Accounting Office, Unfunded Mandates: Reform Act Has Had Little Effect on Agencies’ Rulemaking 
Actions, GAO-GDD-98-30, February 4, 1998, p. 29, at http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/225165.pdf; and U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, Unfunded Mandates: Views Vary About Reform Act’s Strengths, Weaknesses, and 
Options for Improvement, GAO-05-454, March 31, 2005, p. 27, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05454.pdf. For 
further analysis concerning OIRA, see CRS Report RL32397, Federal Rulemaking: The Role of the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, coordinated by Maeve P. Carey. 
94 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Unfunded Mandates: Views Vary About Reform Act’s Strengths, 
Weaknesses, and Options for Improvement, GAO-05-454, March 31, 2005, pp. 26, 27, at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d05454.pdf; and U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 
2008 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, 
and Tribal Entities, 2008, p. 25. 
95 U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal Rulemaking: Agencies Often Published Final Actions Without Proposed 
Rules, GAO/GGD-98-126, August 31, 1998, pp. 1, 2, at http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/226214.pdf; and U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, Federal Rulemaking: Past Reviews and Emerging Trends Suggest Issues That 
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In addition, UMRA’s threshold for federal mandates in rules is limited to expenditures, in contrast 
to the thresholds in Title I which refer to direct costs. As a result, a federal rule’s estimated annual 
effect on direct costs might meet Title I’s threshold, but might not meet Title II’s threshold if the 
rule does not compel nonfederal entities to spend that amount. For example, under Title I, direct 
costs include any amounts that state and local governments are prohibited from raising in revenue 
to comply with the mandate. These costs are not considered when determining whether a mandate 
meets Title II’s threshold because funds not received are not expenditures.96 
Also, in contrast to Title I, Title II does not require the agencies issuing regulations to address the 
question of whether federal funding is available to cover the costs to the private sector of 
mandates imposed by regulations. In general, agencies lack authority to provide such funding, 
which could be provided only by legislative action. Title II addresses the funding only of 
intergovernmental mandates, and only by requiring that agencies identify the extent to which 
federal resources may be available to carry out those mandates.97 The differences in the coverage 
of Title I and Title II may reflect a compromise reached with congressional Members who 
opposed using UMRA as a vehicle to address broader regulatory reform advocated by business 
interests. For example, Senator John Glenn argued in the Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs’ committee report on UMRA: 
Another problematic change from S. 993 is the expansion of the “regulatory accountability 
and reform” provisions of Title 2 to go beyond intergovernmental mandates to address any 
and all regulatory effects on the private sector. The intended purpose of S. 1 is to control 
unfunded Federal mandates on State and local governments. I have always supported that 
goal. Moreover, I believe that if we keep the bill sharply focused on that purpose, we can get 
the legislation passed quickly and signed into law. If, however, we let the bill be stretched to 
cover other issues, we hurt prospects for enactment and we break our pledge to our friends in 
the State and local governments.... I believe that the bill should be brought back to its 
original purpose by limiting regulatory analysis to intergovernmental mandates.... In short, I 
support using this legislation to control intergovernmental regulatory costs. I oppose using 
this bill to address broader regulatory reform issues.98 
Federal Agency Cost Estimate Statements in Major Federal Rules 
From March 22, 1995, when UMRA’s Title II became effective, to the end of FY2012, OMB 
reviewed 809 final rules with estimated benefits and/or costs exceeding $100 million annually.99 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
Merit Congressional Attention, GAO-06-228T, November 1, 2005, pp. 8-10, at http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/
112501.pdf. 
96 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Unfunded Mandates: Views Vary About Reform Act’s Strengths, 
Weaknesses, and Options for Improvement, GAO-05-454, March 31, 2005, p. 27, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d05454.pdf. 
97 2 U.S.C. §1532 (a)(2). 
98 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995, report to 
accompany S. 1, 104th Cong., 1st sess., January 11, 1995, S.Rept. 104-1 (Washington: GPO, 1995), p. 28. 
99 U.S. General Accounting Office, Unfunded Mandates: Reform Act Has Had Little Effect on Agencies’ Rulemaking 
Actions, GAO-GDD-98-30, February 4, 1998, p. 16, at http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/225165.pdf; U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget, 1997 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations, September 1997, chapter 
3; U.S. Office of Management and Budget,1998 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations, January 
1999, p. 44; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2000 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of 
Regulations, June 2000, pp. 37, 38; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Making Sense of Regulation: 2001 Report 
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Most (73.3%) of those “major” rules (593) did not contain provisions meeting UMRA’s definition 
of a mandate. Whereas, as Table 1 and Table 2 show, CBO identified slightly more private-
sector mandates than intergovernmental mandates, Table 4 shows that most of the mandates 
identified in regulations have been directed at the private sector. This emphasis appears consistent 
with the original concern of business advocates to extend the concept of mandates to the area of 
regulatory reform. As indicated in Table 4, during the time period covered, 207 major rules met 
UMRA’s definition of a mandate on the private sector and, therefore, were issued an UMRA cost 
estimate statement and 11 met UMRA’s definition of a mandate on state, local, and tribal 
governments and, therefore, were issued an UMRA cost estimate statement.  
Table 4. UMRA Written Mandate Cost Estimate Statements Issued by 
Federal Agencies in Final Rules, 1995-2012 
Time Period Private-Sector Mandates Public-Sector Mandates Total 
June 1995-May 2000 76 4 80 
June 2000-May 2001 16 2 18 
May 2001-October 2001 4 0 4 
October 2001-September 2002 5 0 5 
October 2002-September 2003 17 0 17 
October 2003-September 2004 10 0 10 
October 2004-September 2005 3 1 4 
October 2005-September 2006 9 1 10 
October 2006-September 2007 11 0 11 
October 2007-September 2008 8 0 8 
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to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, 
December 2001, pp. 20, 21; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Stimulating Smarter Regulation: 2002 Report to 
Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, 
December 2002, pp. 46, 47; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Informing Regulatory Decisions: 2003Report to 
Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, 
September 2003, p. 10; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Progress in Regulatory Reform: 2004 Report to 
Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, 
December 2004, p. 12; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Validating Regulatory Analysis: 2005 Report to 
Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, 
December 2005, p. 11; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2006 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of 
Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, January 2007, p. 6; U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget, 2007 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates 
on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, June 2008, p. 7; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2008 Report to Congress 
on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, January 2009, p. 
8; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Draft 2009 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal 
Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, September 2009, p. 8; U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget, 2010 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded 
Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, July 2010, p. 3; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2011 Report to 
Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal 
Entities, June 2011, p. 3; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Draft 2012 Report to Congress on the Benefits and 
Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, March 2012, pp. 3, 32, 96; 
and U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Draft 2013 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal 
Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, April 2013, p. 3. 
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Time Period Private-Sector Mandates Public-Sector Mandates Total 
October 2008-September 2009 11 1 12 
October 2009-September 2010 13 0 13 
October 2010-September 2011 13 0 13 
October 2011-September 2012 9 2 11 
Total 207 11 216 
Sources: Joint Hearing, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Energy 
Policy, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs, and House Committee on Rules, Subcommittee on Technology 
and the House, Unfunded Mandates: A Five Year Review and Recommendations for Change, hearing on the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 107th Cong., 1st sess., May 24, 2001, H. Hrg. 107-19 (Washington: GPO, 2001), p. 
40; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Making Sense of Regulation: 2001 Report to Congress on the Costs and 
Benefits of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, December 2001, pp. 189-195; U.S. 
Office of Management and Budget, Stimulating Smarter Regulation: 2002 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits 
of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, December 2002, pp. 161, 162; U.S. Office 
of Management and Budget, Informing Regulatory Decisions: 2003 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of 
Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, September 2003, pp. 202-204; U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget, Progress in Regulatory Reform: 2004 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of 
Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, December 2004, pp. 225-234; U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget, Validating Regulatory Analysis: 2005 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of 
Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, December 2005, pp. 143-148; U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget, 2006 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates 
on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, January 2007, pp. 141-143; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2007 Report 
to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, June 
2008, pp. 76-81; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2008 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of 
Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, January 2009, pp. 77-81; U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget, 2009 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded 
Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, January 27, 2010, pp. 62-65; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 
2010 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and 
Tribal Entities, July 20, 2010, pp. 73-79; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2011 Report to Congress on the 
Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, June 24, 2011, pp. 
94-98; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Draft 2012 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal 
Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, March 2012, pp. 96-99; and U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget, Draft 2013 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and 
Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, April 2013, pp. 3, 75-92. 
The 11 intergovernmental rules, 9 issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
were as follows: 
• EPA’s Rule on Standards of Performance for Municipal Waste Combustors and 
Emissions Guidelines (1995), with estimated costs of $320 million annually; 
• EPA’s Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and Guidelines for 
Control of Existing Sources: Municipal Solid Waste Landfills (1996), with 
estimated costs of $110 million annually; 
• EPA’s National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Disinfectants and 
Disinfection Byproducts (1998), with estimated costs of $700 million annually; 
• EPA’s National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Interim Enhanced Surface 
Water Treatment (1998), with estimated costs of $300 million annually; 
• EPA’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination: System B Regulations for 
Revision of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water 
Discharges (1999), with estimated costs of $803.1 million annually; 
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• EPA’s National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications 
to Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring (2001), with estimated 
costs of $206 million annually;  
• EPA’s National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Long Term 2 Enhanced 
Surface Water Treatment (2005), with estimated costs between $60 million and 
$170 million per year;  
• EPA’s National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Stage 2 Disinfection 
Byproducts Rule (2006), with estimated costs of at least $100 million annually;  
• Health Insurance Reform; Modifications to the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) Electronic Transaction Standards (2009), with 
estimated costs of $1.1 billion per year; 
• EPA’s National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and 
Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards for Performance 
for Electric Utility Steam Generating Units (2011), with estimated costs of $8.2 
billion annually; and  
• U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Nutrition Standards in the National School 
Lunch and School Breakfast Programs (2012), with estimated costs of $479 
million annually.100 
Impact on the Rulemaking Process 
In 1997, Senators Fred Thompson and John Glenn, chair and ranking minority Member of the 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, respectively, asked GAO to review federal agencies’ 
implementation of UMRA’s Title II. On February 4, 1998, GAO issued its report, concluding that 
“our review of federal agencies’ implementation of Title II of UMRA indicates that this title of 
the act has had little direct effect on agencies’ rulemaking actions during the first 2 years of its 
implementation.”101 
                                                 
100 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2000 Report to Congress On the Costs and Benefits of Federal 
Regulations, p. 31, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/2000fedreg-report.pdf; U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 2008 Report to Congress on the Benefits and 
Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, 2009, pp. 24-27, at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/information_and_regulatory_affairs/2008_cb_final.pdf; U.S. 
Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 2010 Report to Congress on the 
Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates On State, Local, And Tribal Entities, July 20, 2010, 
pp. 77, 78, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/reports/2010_Benefit_Cost_Report.pdf; 
and U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2013 Draft Report to Congress On the Costs and Benefits of Federal 
Regulations, pp. 70, 72, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2013_cb/
draft_2013_cost_benefit_report.pdf. The rule on Standards for Privacy of Individually Available Health Information, 
issued in 2001 by the Department of Health and Human Services, was identified as costing state and local governments 
$240 million annually, but the rule was later determined not to be an enforceable duty as defined under UMRA. The 
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Rule, issued in 2007, was 
identified as having the potential to require certain municipalities that own and/or operate power generating facilities to 
purchase security enhancements. However, DHS was unable to determine whether the rule would impose an 
enforceable duty on state and local governments of $100 million or more (adjusted for inflation) in any one year. OMB 
includes the rule as a state and local government mandate meeting UMRA’s requirements “for the sake of 
completeness.” 
101 U.S. General Accounting Office, Unfunded Mandates: Reform Act Has Had Little Effect on Agencies’ Rulemaking 
Actions, GAO-GDD-98-30, February 4, 1998, p. 29, at http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/225165.pdf. 
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GAO concluded that Title II had limited impact on agencies’ rulemaking primarily because of its 
limited coverage. For example, GAO noted that written mandate cost estimate statements were 
not on file at CBO for 80 of the 110 economically significant rules published in the Federal 
Register between March 22, 1995, and March 22, 1997. GAO examined the 80 economically 
significant rules that lacked a written mandate cost estimate statement and concluded that UMRA 
did not require a written mandate cost estimate statement for 78 of them because the rule either 
did not have an associated notice of proposed rulemaking (18 instances); did not impose an 
enforceable duty (3 instances); imposed such a duty but only as a condition of federal assistance 
(33 instances); imposed such a duty but only as part of a voluntary program (11 instances); did 
not involve an expenditure of $100 million in any single year by the private sector or by state, 
local, and tribal governments (12 instances); or incorporated requirements specifically set forth in 
law (1 instance). GAO concluded that written mandate cost estimate statements should have been 
filed at CBO for two of the rules that lacked one, but, in both instances, the rules appeared to 
satisfy UMRA’s written statement requirements.102 
Even where UMRA applied, GAO concluded that the act did not appear to have had much effect 
on federal agencies’ rulemaking actions because UMRA does not require agencies to take the 
actions required in the statute if the agencies determine that the actions are duplicative of other 
actions or that accurate estimates of the rule’s future compliance costs are not feasible.103 Because 
federal agencies’ rules commonly contain an estimate of compliance costs, GAO found that most 
agencies rarely prepared a separate UMRA written cost estimate statement. Moreover, Executive 
Order 12866, which was issued more than a year before UMRA’s enactment, already required 
federal agencies to provide OIRA with assessments of the costs and benefits of all economically 
significant rules. GAO also concluded that UMRA did not substantially change agencies’ 
intergovernmental consultation processes.104 
In 2001, OMB’s director, Mitchell L. Daniels, Jr., acknowledged at a House hearing coinciding 
with UMRA’s fifth anniversary that UMRA’s Title II had not resulted in major changes in federal 
agency rulemaking. He noted that, according to OMB’s five annual reports to Congress on the 
implementation of Title II, 80 rules had required the preparation of a separate written mandate 
cost estimate statement (see Table 4). He said that “it was hard to believe that only 80 regulations 
had significant impacts on state, local, or tribal governments, or the private sector. In fact, it 
appears that agencies have attempted to limit their consultative processes, and ignored potential 
alternative remedies, by aggressively utilizing the exemptions outlined by the Act.”105 He added 
that “when agencies fail to solicit or consider the views of states and localities, they deny 
themselves the benefit of state and local innovation and experience. This will not be accepted 
practice in this [George W. Bush] Administration.”106 
In 2004, GAO released a second study of UMRA’s implementation of Title II (and the first for 
Title I), focusing on statutes enacted and rules published during 2001 and 2002. GAO found that 
                                                 
102 Ibid., pp. 12-16. 
103 Ibid., p. 28. 
104 Ibid., pp. 21, 22. 
105 Joint Hearing, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural 
Resources and Regulatory Affairs, and House Committee on Rules, Subcommittee on Technology and the House, 
Unfunded Mandates: A Five Year Review and Recommendations for Change, hearing on the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act of 1995, 107th Cong., 1st sess., May 24, 2001, H. Hrg. 107-19 (Washington: GPO, 2001), p. 40. 
106 Ibid. 
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5 of 377 statutes enacted and 9 of 122 major or economically significant final rules issued in 2001 
or 2002 were identified as containing federal mandates at or above UMRA’s thresholds.107 GAO 
concluded its report by stating that “the findings raise the question of whether UMRA’s 
procedures, definitions, and exclusions adequately capture and subject to scrutiny federal 
statutory and regulatory actions that might impose significant financial burdens on affected 
nonfederal parties.”108  
As noted earlier, in 2005, GAO sought and received input from participating parties about 
UMRA’s strengths and weaknesses and potential options for reinforcing the strengths or 
addressing the weaknesses. It also held a symposium on federal mandates to examine those 
identified strengths and weaknesses in more depth.109 Although the symposium’s participants 
viewed UMRA’s coverage as its most significant issue, GAO reported that comments received 
concerning federal agency consultation with state and local governments under Title II “focused 
on the quality of consultations across agencies, which was viewed as inconsistent” and that “a 
few parties commented that UMRA had improved consultation and collaboration between federal 
agencies and nonfederal levels of government.”110  
At a Senate hearing held on April 14, 2005, OIRA’s director, John Graham, testified that OMB 
includes summaries of agency consultations with state and local government officials in its 
annual report to Congress and that “this year’s report shows an increased level of engagement.”111 
He added that there were “some very good examples of consultation that are documented in that 
report at the Department of Education, the Environmental Protection Agency and so forth, but I 
think that it would be fair to say that those best practices are not necessarily uniform across the 
federal government or across any particular agency.”112 State and local government officials 
testifying at the hearing stated that federal agency consultation had improved somewhat, but 
remained “sporadic.”113  
Congressional Issues for Title II 
Exemptions and Exclusions 
State and local government public interest groups continue to advocate a broadening of Title II’s 
coverage. For example, as mentioned previously, they advocate a broader definition of what 
UMRA considers a mandate, under the presumption that a broader definition would subject more 
rules to Title II. An alternative approach would be to separate debates concerning the definition of 
                                                 
107 U.S. General Accounting Office, Unfunded Mandates: Analysis of Reform Act Coverage, GAO-04-637, May 12, 
2004, pp. 4, 28-33, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04637.pdf. 
108 Ibid., pp. 36, 37. 
109 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Unfunded Mandates: Views Vary About Reform Act’s Strengths, 
Weaknesses, and Options for Improvement, GAO-05-454, March 31, 2005, pp. 3, 4, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d05454.pdf. 
110 Ibid., p. 20. 
111 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight of 
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Passing the Buck: A Review of the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, hearing on the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 109th Cong., 1st sess., April 14, 2005, 
S. Hrg. 109-82 (Washington: GPO, 2005), p. 52. 
112 Ibid., pp. 16. 
113 Ibid., pp. 22, 23, 27. 
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“mandate” and UMRA’s coverage, and, instead, apply Title II’s information requirements to 
whatever classes of federally induced costs Congress deems appropriate to cover. This approach 
might be implemented by incorporating coverage of various kinds of “federally induced costs,” 
adopting the terminology proposed earlier by ACIR. In either case, inasmuch as Title II’s 
requirements are informational only, their extension to new classes of regulations, or to new kinds 
of federally induced costs, would not affect the authority of agencies to issue regulations or the 
substance of the regulations that could be issued. 
As mentioned previously, UMRA’s threshold for federal mandates in rules is limited to 
expenditures, in contrast to the thresholds in Title I that refer to direct costs. Several bills were 
introduced during the 112th Congress to broaden Title II’s coverage. For example, S. 1189, the 
Unfunded Mandates Accountability Act of 2011, its companion bill in the House, H.R. 2964, and 
S. 1720, the Jobs Through Growth Act: Title VII, the Unfunded Mandates Accountability Act, 
would have removed UMRA’s exemption for rules issued by most independent agencies. These 
bills would have, among other things, also amended Title II to apply to “the cost of compliance 
and any reasonably foreseeable indirect costs, including revenues lost as a result of an agency rule 
subject to this section.”114 The bills would also have required each federal agency to prepare and 
publish in the Federal Register an initial and final regulatory impact analysis and, before 
promulgating any proposed or final rule for which a regulatory impact analysis is required, 
identify and consider a reasonable number of regulatory alternatives and select the least costly, 
most cost-effective, or least burdensome alternative that achieves the statute’s objectives.115  
State and local government advocacy groups have also argued that Title II should apply to rules 
issued by independent regulatory agencies.116 Although OMB does not review rules issued by 
independent regulatory agencies, in recent years it has included information concerning 
independent regulatory agency rules in its annual UMRA report to Congress. According to those 
reports, independent regulatory agencies issued 185 major rules from FY1997 through FY2011.117 
S. 1189, S. 1720, and H.R. 2964 would have, among other things, amended Title II to apply to 
                                                 
114 S. 1189, the Unfunded Mandates Accountability Act of 2011, §202. Regulatory Impact Analyses For Certain Rules. 
The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. H.R. 2964, the 
Unfunded Mandates Accountability Act of 2011, §202. Regulatory Impact Analyses For Certain Rules. The bill was 
referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s Subcommittee on Technology, Information 
Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and Procurement Reform and to the House Committee on the Judiciary, the House 
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rules issued by most independent regulatory agencies. The bills would have retained the 
exemption for rules that concern monetary policy proposed or implemented by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Open Market Committee.118 
The National Association of Counties (NACO) and other state and local government public 
interest groups have also advocated a strengthening of OMB’s role in the enforcement of Title II 
to ensure consistent application of UMRA’s provisions across federal agencies.119 For example, 
NCSL’s current policy statement on unfunded mandates recommends that UMRA be amended to 
include “the creation of an office within the Office of Management and Budget that is analogous 
to the State and Local Government Cost Estimates Unit at the Congressional Budget Office.”120 
Business organizations, led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, also have advocated an 
independent review of federal agency cost estimates, recommending that the reviews be 
conducted by OMB or GAO. They also have advocated the permitting of early judicial challenges 
to an agency’s failure to complete an UMRA cost estimate statement or for completing one that is 
deficient.121 
H.R. 214, the Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis Creation and Sunset and Review Act 
of 2011, would have created a Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis.122 The bill included a 
provision that would have transferred from CBO’s director to the director of the proposed 
Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis the responsibility to compare federal agency 
estimates of the cost of regulations implementing an act containing a federal mandate to the 
CBO’s estimate of those costs. The Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis would also have 
received federal agency statements that accompany significant regulatory actions. 
As mentioned previously, organizations representing various environmental and social groups 
have argued that UMRA has achieved its stated goals of strengthening the partnership between 
the federal government and state, local, and tribal governments by promoting informed and 
deliberate decisions by Congress on the appropriateness of federal mandates. In their view, 
broadening UMRA’s coverage would dilute its impact. For example, a participant at GAO’s 2005 
symposium on federal mandates argued that eliminating any of UMRA’s exclusions and 
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S. Hrg. 109-82 (Washington: GPO, 2005), p. 124. 
120 National Conference of State Legislatures, “State and Federal Budgeting: Federal Mandate Relief,” at 
http://www.ncsl.org/Default.aspx?TabID=773&tabs=855,20,632#FederalMandate. 
121 Joint Hearing, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural 
Resources and Regulatory Affairs, and House Committee on Rules, Subcommittee on Technology and the House, 
Unfunded Mandates: A Five Year Review and Recommendations for Change, hearing on the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act of 1995, 107th Cong., 1st sess., May 24, 2001, H. Hrg. 107-19 (Washington: GPO, 2001), pp. 80, 88, 89. 
122 H.R. 214, the Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis Creation and Sunset and Review Act of 2011, was 
introduced on January 7, 2011 and referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and House Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform. The bill was later referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary’s 
Subcommittee on Courts, Commercial and Administrative Law and the House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform’s Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs, Stimulus Oversight and Government Spending. 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act: History, Impact, and Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 35 
exemptions might make the identification of mandates less meaningful, saying “The more red 
flags run up, the less important the red flag becomes.”123 Also, some of the participants at the 
symposium from the academic, policy research institute, and public interest advocacy sectors 
argued that it was essential that some of the existing exclusions, such as those dealing with 
constitutional and statutory rights barring discrimination against various groups, be retained. 
They also advocated additional exclusions to include federal actions regarding public health, 
safety, environmental protection, workers’ rights, and the disabled.124 
Federal Agency Consultation Requirements 
State and local government public interest groups assert that enhanced requirements for federal 
agency consultation with state and local government officials during the rulemaking process are 
needed.125 For example, the NCSL has asserted that federal agency “consultation with state and 
local governments in the construction of these rules is haphazard.”126 It recommends that Title II 
be amended to include “enhanced requirements for federal agencies to consult with state and local 
governments.”127  
OMB asserts that “federal agencies have been actively consulting with states, localities, and tribal 
governments in order to ensure that regulatory activities were conducted consistent with the 
requirements of UMRA.”128 In addition, OMB notes that it has had guidelines in place since 
September 21, 1995, to assist federal agencies in complying with the act.129 The current 
guidelines suggest that (1) intergovernmental consultations should take place as early as possible, 
beginning before issuance of a proposed rule and continuing through the final rule stage, and be 
integrated explicitly into the rulemaking process; (2) agencies should consult with a wide variety 
of state, local, and tribal officials; (3) agencies should estimate direct benefits and costs to assist 
with these consultations; (4) the scope of consultation should reflect the cost and significance of 
the mandate being considered; (5) effective consultation requires trust and significant and 
sustained attention so that all who participate can enjoy frank discussion and focus on key 
priorities; and (6) agencies should seek out state, local, and tribal views on costs, benefits, risks, 
and alternative methods of compliance, and whether the federal rule will harmonize with and not 
duplicate similar laws in other levels of government.130 
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OMB often includes summaries of selected consultation activities by agencies whose actions 
affect state, local, and tribal governments in its annual draft and final UMRA reports to Congress. 
OMB has argued that the summaries are an indication that federal agencies are complying with 
the act. For example, in OMB’s draft 2012 UMRA report to Congress, OMB wrote in the 
introduction to these summaries: 
Four agencies (the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, and Health and Human 
Services) have provided examples of consultation activities that involved State, local and 
tribal governments not only in their regulatory processes, but also in their program planning 
and implementation phases. These agencies have worked to enhance the regulatory 
environment by improving the way in which the Federal Government relates to its 
intergovernmental partners. In general, many of the departments and agencies not listed here 
(including the Departments of Justice, State, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs, the Small 
Business Administration, and the General Services Administration) do not often impose 
mandates upon States, localities or tribes, and thus have fewer occasions to consult with 
these governments. 
As the following descriptions indicate, Federal agencies conduct a wide range of 
consultations. Agency consultations sometimes involve multiple levels of government, 
depending on the agency’s understanding of the scope and impact of the rule. OMB 
continues to work with agencies to ensure that consultation occurs with the appropriate level 
of government.131 
During the 112th Congress, several bills were introduced which would have required federal 
agencies to enhance their consultation with UMRA stakeholders, including H.R. 373, the 
Unfunded Mandates Information and Transparency Act of 2011, and H.R. 4078, the Red Tape 
Reduction and Small Business Job Creation Act: Title IV, the Unfunded Mandates Information 
and Transparency Act of 2012, which the House passed on July 26, 2012.132  
As mentioned previously, Title IV of H.R. 4078, the Unfunded Mandates Information and 
Transparency Act of 2012, was reintroduced during the 113th Congress as H.R. 899, the Unfunded 
Mandates Information and Transparency Act of 2013. On July 24, 2013, H.R. 899 was reported 
favorably by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. 
Concluding Observations 
In 1995, UMRA’s enactment was considered an historic, milestone event in the history of 
American intergovernmental relations. For example, when signing UMRA, President Bill Clinton 
said, 
Today, we are making history. We are working to find the right balance for the 21st century. 
We are recognizing that the pendulum had swung too far, and that we have to rely on the 
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initiative, the creativity, the determination, and the decisionmaking of people at the State and 
local level to carry much of the load for America as we move into the 21st century.133 
Since UMRA’s enactment, parties participating in its implementation and researchers in the 
academic community, policy research institutes, and nonpartisan government agencies have 
reached different conclusions concerning the extent of UMRA’s impact on intergovernmental 
relations and whether UMRA should be amended. State and local government officials and 
federalism scholars generally view UMRA as having a limited, though positive, impact on 
intergovernmental relations. In their view, the federal government has continued to expand its 
authority through the “carrots” of increased federal assistance and the “sticks” of grant 
conditions, preemptions, mandates, and administrative rulemaking. Facing what they view as a 
seemingly ever growing federal influence in American governance, they generally advocate a 
broadening of UMRA’s coverage to enhance its impact, emphasizing the need to include 
conditions of grant assistance and a broader range of federal agency rulemaking, including rules 
issued by independent regulatory agencies.  
Other organizations, representing various environmental and social groups, argue that UMRA’s 
coverage does not need to be broadened. In their view, UMRA has accomplished its goals of 
fostering improved intergovernmental relations and ensuring that when Congress votes on major 
federal mandates it is aware of the costs imposed by the legislation. They assert that UMRA’s 
current limits on coverage should be maintained or reinforced by adding exclusions for mandates 
regarding public health, safety, workers’ rights, environmental protection, and the disabled.134 
During the 111th Congress, UMRA received increased attention as Congress considered various 
proposals to reform health care. Governors, for example, expressed opposition to proposals that 
would have required states to contribute toward the cost of expanding Medicaid eligibility, 
asserting that the expansion could inflate state deficits and impose on states what Tennessee 
Governor Philip Bredesen reportedly described as the “mother of all unfunded mandates.”135 
However, as mentioned previously, proposals to expand Medicaid eligibility are not covered by 
UMRA because it has been determined that states “have significant flexibility to make 
programmatic adjustments in their Medicaid programs to accommodate” new federal 
requirements.136  
As discussed previously, during the 112th Congress several bills were introduced, and one bill was 
passed by the House (H.R. 4078, the Red Tape Reduction and Small Business Job Creation Act: 
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Title IV, the Unfunded Mandates Information and Transparency Act of 2012), that would have 
broadened UMRA’s coverage.137  
During the 113th Congress, the UMRA provisions in H.R. 4078 were reintroduced, on February 
28, 2013, as H.R. 899, the Unfunded Mandates Information and Transparency Act of 2013. The 
bill, which was reported favorably by the House Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform on July 24, 2013, would among other provisions, 
• require CBO to assess the prospective costs of changes in conditions of federal 
financial assistance when requested by the chair or ranking Member of a 
committee; 
• broaden UMRA’s coverage to include assessments of indirect as well as direct 
costs by amending the definition of direct costs to include forgone profits, costs 
passed onto consumers or other entities, and, to the extent practicable, behavioral 
changes; 
• expand the scope of reporting requirements to include regulations imposed by 
most independent regulatory agencies; 
• make private-sector mandates subject to a substantive point of order; 
• establish principals for federal agencies to follow when assessing the effects of 
regulations on state and local governments and the private sector, including 
requiring the agency to identify the problem it seeks to address, determining 
whether existing laws or regulations could be modified to address the problem, 
identifying alternatives, and designing its regulations in the most cost-effective 
manner available; 
• expand the scope of cost statements accompanying significant regulatory actions 
to include, among other requirements, a reasonably detailed description of the 
need for the proposed rulemaking or final rule and an explanation of how the 
proposed rulemaking or final rule will meet that need; an assessment of the 
potential costs and benefits of the proposed rulemaking or final rule; estimates of 
the mandate’s future compliance costs and any disproportionate budgetary effects 
upon any particular regions of the nation or state, local, or tribal governments; a 
detailed description of the agency’s consultation with the private sector or elected 
representatives of the affected state, local, or tribal governments; and a detailed 
summary of how the agency complied with each of the regulatory principles 
included in the bill; 
• require federal agencies to meet enhanced levels of consultation with state, local, 
and tribal governments and the private sector before issuing a notice of proposed 
rulemaking or a final rule; and  
• require federal agencies to conduct a retrospective analysis of the costs and 
benefits of an existing regulation when requested by the chair or ranking Member 
of a committee. 
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Underlying disagreements over UMRA’s future are fundamentally different values concerning 
American federalism. One view emphasizes the importance of freeing state and local government 
officials from the constraints brought about by the directives and costs associated with federal 
mandates so they can experiment with innovative ways to achieve results with greater efficiency 
and cost effectiveness. This view focuses on the positive effect active state and local governments 
can have in promoting a sense of state and community responsibility and self-reliance, 
encouraging participation and civic responsibility by allowing more people to become involved in 
public questions, adapting public programs to state and local needs and conditions, and reducing 
the political turmoil that sometimes results from single policies that govern the entire nation.138 
Another view emphasizes the federal government’s responsibility to ensure that all citizens are 
afforded minimum levels of essential government services. This view focuses on the propensity 
of states to restrict governmental services because they compete with one another for businesses 
and taxpaying residents; the variation in state fiscal capacities that make it difficult for some 
states to provide certain governmental services even though they might have the political will to 
do so; and the propensity of states to have different views concerning what services are essential 
and what constitutes a sufficient level of essential government services.139 
Given these disagreements over fundamental values, it is perhaps not surprising that there are 
differences of opinion concerning UMRA’s future. Using President Clinton’s words, debates over 
UMRA’s future are more than just arguments over who will pay for what; they are also about 
finding “the right balance” for American federalism in the 21st century. 
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Appendix A. The Rise of Unfunded Mandates as a 
National Issue and UMRA’s Legislative History 
Unfunded mandates became a national issue during the 1980s as state and local government 
officials and their affiliated public interest groups, led by the National League of Cities (NLC), 
U.S. Conference of Mayors (USCM), and National Association of Counties (NACO), began an 
intensive lobbying effort to limit unfunded intergovernmental mandates. Their efforts were 
supported by various business organizations, led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which 
opposed the imposition of unfunded mandates on both state and local governments and the 
private sector, particularly mandates issued through federal rules.140  
Increased Number and Cost of Unfunded Mandates 
State and local government officials became involved in the issue of unfunded federal mandates 
during the 1980s primarily because the number and costs of unfunded intergovernmental 
mandates were increasing and, by then, nearly every community in the nation had become subject 
to their effects. For example, ACIR reported that during the 1980s the costs of unfunded 
intergovernmental mandates were increasing at a rate faster than federal assistance. ACIR also 
identified 63 federal statutes as of 1990 that, in its view, imposed “major” restrictions or costs on 
state and local governments. Many of the statutes involved civil rights, consumer protection, 
improved health and safety, and environmental protection.141 Only 2 of the 63 statutes it 
identified, the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931 and Hatch Act of 1940, were enacted prior to 1964, 9 
were enacted during the 1960s, 25 during the 1970s, 21 during the 1980s, and 6 in 1990. A study 
completed by the Clinton Administration’s National Performance Review identified 172 laws in 
force that imposed requirements (regardless of the magnitude of their impact) on state and local 
governments as of December 1992.142 
Some of the major federal statutes adopted during the 1970s that imposed relatively costly federal 
mandates on state and local governments were the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 
which extended the prohibitions against discrimination in employment contained in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 to state and local government employment; the Fair Labor Standards Act 
Amendments of 1974, which extended the prohibitions against age discrimination in the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 to state and local government employment; and the 
Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978, which established federal requirements 
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concerning the pricing of electricity and natural gas.143 One of the more costly federal mandates 
enacted during the 1970s was Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. It prohibited 
discrimination against handicapped persons in federally assisted programs. CBO estimated that it 
would require states and localities to spend $6.8 billion over 30 years to equip buses with 
wheelchair lifts, to install elevators in subway systems, and to expand access to public transit 
systems for the physically disabled.144 
Three of the more costly unfunded federal mandates adopted during the 1980s were the Safe 
Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986 (which was estimated to impose an additional cost of 
between $2 billion and $3 billion on state and local governments to improve public water 
systems); the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986 (which required schools to 
remove hazardous asbestos at an estimated cost of $3.15 billion over 30 years); and the Water 
Quality Act of 1987 (which was estimated to cost states and localities about $12 billion in capital 
costs for wastewater treatment).145 ACIR estimated that new federal mandates adopted between 
1983 and 1990 cost state and local governments between $8.9 billion and $12.7 billion, 
depending on the definition of mandate used; in FY1991, federal mandates imposed estimated 
costs of between $2.2 billion and $3.6 billion on state and local governments; and additional 
mandates, not included in these estimates, were scheduled to take effect in the years ahead.146 
ACIR suggested that the expansion of federal intergovernmental mandates during the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s fundamentally changed the nature of intergovernmental relations in the United 
States:  
During the 1960s and 1970s, state and local governments for the first time were brought 
under extensive federal regulatory controls.... Over this period, national controls have been 
adopted affecting public functions and services ranging from automobile inspection, animal 
preservation and college athletics to waste treatment and waste disposal. In field after field 
the power to set standards and determine methods of compliance has shifted from the states 
and localities to Washington.147  
State and Local Governments Seek Relief from 
Unfunded Mandates 
Edward I. Koch, then mayor of New York City and a former Member of Congress, was one of the 
first public officials to highlight the mandate issue. In 1980, he authored an article criticizing 
what he called “the mandate millstone.”148 He noted that as a Member of Congress he voted for 
many federal mandates “with every confidence that we were enacting sensible permanent 
solutions to critical problems” but now that he was a mayor he had come to realize that “over the 
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past decade, a maze of complex statutory and administrative directives has come to threaten both 
the initiative and the financial health of local governments throughout the country.”149  
The continued growth in the number and cost of federal mandates during the 1980s and early 
1990s generated renewed and heightened opposition from state and local government officials 
and their affiliated public interest groups. This opposition culminated in the National Unfunded 
Mandates (NUM) Day initiative, sponsored by the NLC, USCM, NACO, and International 
City/County Management Association. Held on October 27, 1993, local government officials 
across the nation held press conferences and public forums criticizing unfunded mandates, and 
released a study of the costs imposed by federal mandates on local governments. Over 300 cities 
and 128 counties participated in the study, which, when extrapolated nationally, estimated that 
federal mandates imposed additional costs of $6.5 billion annually for cities and $4.8 billion 
annually for counties.150  
The NUM Day methodology used to estimate the costs of unfunded federal mandates was later 
challenged because of the absence of independent validation of local government submissions 
and the non-random nature of the participating jurisdictions. However, politically, NUM Day was 
considered a success by its organizers for two reasons. First, it attracted unprecedented media 
attention to the issue of unfunded federal mandates. For example, the number of newspaper 
articles discussing unfunded federal mandates increased from 22 in 1992, to 179 in 1993, and to 
836 in 1994.151 Second, it increased congressional awareness of state and local government 
concerns about unfunded mandates. For example, on January 5, 1995, Senator John Glenn 
mentioned NUM Day as having an impact on congressional awareness of unfunded mandates at a 
Senate congressional hearing on S. 1—The Unfunded Mandate Reform Act: 
On October 27, 1993, State and local elected officials from all over the Nation came to 
Washington and declared that day—“National Unfunded Mandates Day.” These officials 
conveyed a powerful message to Congress and the Clinton Administration on the need for 
Federal mandate reform and relief. They raised four major objections to unfunded Federal 
mandates. 
First, unfunded Federal mandates impose unreasonable fiscal burdens on their budgets; 
Second, they limit State and local government flexibility to address more pressing local 
problems like crime and education; 
Third, Federal mandates too often come in a “one-size-fits-all” box that stifles the 
development of more innovative local efforts—efforts that ultimately may be more effective 
in solving the problem the Federal Mandate is meant to address; and  
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Fourth, they allow Congress to get credit for passing some worthy mandate or program, 
while leaving State and local governments with the difficult tasks of cutting services or 
raising taxes in order to pay for it.152 
State and local government officials continued to lobby Congress for mandate relief legislation 
and coordinated their efforts to increase public awareness of their concerns. For example, on 
March 21, 1994, state and local government officials across the nation held town hall meetings 
and their affiliated public interest groups sponsored a rally on the Capitol steps to draw media 
attention to their concerns about unfunded federal mandates. The NLC and state municipal 
leagues across the country also declared October 24-30, 1994, Unfunded Mandates Week, which 
also generated considerable media coverage.153 
The Initial Congressional Response 
The efforts of state and local government officials appeared to have an effect on congressional 
legislative activity concerning unfunded federal mandates. During the 102nd Congress (1991-
1992), 12 federal mandate relief bills were introduced in the House and 10 were introduced in the 
Senate. All of these bills failed to be reported out of committee, and only one had a congressional 
hearing. During the first session of the 103rd Congress (1993), 32 federal mandate relief bills were 
introduced and one of them, S. 993, the Federal Mandate Accountability and Reform Act of 1994 
co-sponsored by Senators John Glenn and Dirk Kempthorne, was reported by the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee on June 16, 1994. It contained several provisions that were later 
in UMRA, and included an amendment offered by Senator Byron Dorgan “to include the private 
sector under the CBO and Committee mandate cost analysis requirements of Title I of S. 993, and 
a Glenn amendment to allow CBO to waive the private-sector cost analysis if CBO cannot make a 
“reasonable estimate” of the bills cost.”154 The bill was considered by the Senate on October 6, 
1994, without a time agreement. After the introduction of several amendments and some debate, 
the Senate proceeded to other issues and adjourned without voting on the measure.155 The House 
Government Operations Committee also reported a bill, H.R. 5128, the Federal Mandates Relief 
for State and Local Government Act of 1994, sponsored by Representative John Conyers, Jr., on 
October 5, 1994. It was similar to S. 993, but its approval was delayed, reportedly due to concerns 
raised by several senior Democratic Members worried that mandate legislation might make it 
more difficult to adopt laws to protect the environment and address social issues. Congress 
adjourned before the bill could move to the floor for consideration.156 
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Core Federalism Principles Debated During 
UMRA’s Consideration  
The Republican Party gained control of the House of Representatives for the first time in 40 years 
following the congressional elections held on November 8, 1994. They also achieved a slim 
majority in the Senate as well.157 Mandate reform was a key provision in the Republican Party’s 
“Contract With America.”158 Perhaps reflecting its importance to the Republican leadership, the 
prospective Senate majority leader, Senator Robert Dole, designated a revised unfunded mandate 
relief bill, co-sponsored by Senators Kempthorne and Glenn and introduced on January 4, 1995, 
the opening day of the new Congress, as S. 1, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. The 
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and Senate Budget Committee held a joint hearing on 
the bill the following day and it was reported out of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee 
with three amendments (9 to 4) on January 9, 1995, and out of the Senate Budget Committee with 
four amendments (21-0) also on January 9, 1995.  
To expedite Senate floor consideration, neither committee filed a committee report. Instead, the 
committee chairs, Senator William Roth, Jr. on behalf of the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee and Senator Pete Domenici on behalf of the Senate Budget Committee, each 
submitted a chairman’s statement for insertion into the Congressional Record.159 When Senate 
floor consideration commenced on January 12, 1995, Senator Robert Byrd objected to several 
features of the way the legislation was being handled, including the absence of a committee report 
and the pace of consideration. In addition, Senators introduced 228 amendments to the bill. Floor 
debate lasted for more than two weeks. During floor debate, Senator Kempthorne argued that the 
bill should be adopted out of a sense of fairness to state and local governments and as a 
commitment to federalism principles:  
Under this legislation, we are acknowledging for the first time, in a meaningful way, that 
there must be limits on the Federal Government’s propensity to impose costly mandates on 
other levels of government. As the representatives of those governments have very 
effectively demonstrated, this is a real problem. Cities, for example, generally are fortunate if 
they have adequate resources just to meet their own local responsibilities. Unfunded Federal 
mandates have put a real strain on those resources. This has been the practice of the Federal 
Government for the past several decades, but in recent years it has mushroomed into an 
intolerable burden.  
This has been due, at least in part, to the Federal Government’s own budget crisis. In the 
past, if Congress felt that a particular problem warranted a national solution, it would often 
fund that solution with Federal dollars. Mandates imposed on State and local governments 
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could frequently be offset with generous Federal grants. But the Federal Government no 
longer has the money to fund the governmental actions it wishes to see accomplished 
throughout the country. In fact, it hasn’t had the money to do this for many years. Instead, it 
borrowed for a long time, to cover those costs. But now the Federal deficit is so large, that 
the only alternative left for imposing so-called national solutions is to impose unfunded 
mandates....  
The State legislators and Governors know this. This is why they feel so strongly that 
legislation regarding this practice must first be in place, before they are asked to ratify a 
balanced budget amendment. Otherwise, in the drive to achieve a balance Federal budget, 
Congress might be tempted to mandate that State and local governments shall pick up many 
of the costs that were formerly Federal. This is why any effort to add a sunset provision to 
this bill ought to be opposed. Our commitment to protect federalism ought to be permanent.  
S. 1 is designed to put in place just such a mechanism. In this regard, it may truly be called 
balanced legislation. First of all, it helps bring our system of federalism back into balance, by 
serving as a check against the easy imposition of unfunded mandates. And, second, it does so 
in a way that strikes a balance between restraining the growth of mandates and recognizing 
that there may be legitimate exceptions.160  
Senator Frank Lautenberg was among those opposing UMRA. He argued that the bill should be 
defeated because, among other things, the federal government has an obligation to set national 
standards to protect the environment and ensure the quality of life for all Americans: 
Halting interstate pollution is an important responsibility of the Federal Government. And I 
am concerned that this act may have a chilling effect on future Federal environmental 
legislation. Another issue that may get loss in this debate is the benefit that States and their 
citizens derive from Federal mandates—even those not fully funded. States may say, we 
know how best to care for our citizens; a program that may be good for New Jersey, may not 
be good for Idaho or Ohio. But, I would argue that there is a broader national interest in 
some very fundamental issues which transcend that premise. I would argue that historically, 
not all States have provided a floor of satisfactory minimum decency standards for their 
citizens and that, as a democratic and fair society, we should worry about that. Further, as a 
practical matter, I would argue that the policies of one State in a society such as ours will 
certainly affect citizens and taxpayers of another State just as certainly as unfunded mandates 
can.  
Let us look at our welfare system. There has been a lot of discussion about turning welfare 
over to the States, with few or virtually no Federal guidelines or requirements. What would 
happen if we do that? Would we see a movement of the disadvantaged between States, 
putting a heavier burden on the citizens of a State that provides more generous benefits?  
Let us look at occupational safety, or environmental regulation. With a patchwork of 
differing standards across the States, would we see a migration of factories and jobs to States 
with lower standards? I think so. But by mandating floors in environmental and workplace 
conditions, the Federal Government ensures that States will comply with minimal standards 
befitting a complex, interrelated, and decent society.  
Or let us look at gun control. My State of New Jersey generally has strong controls on guns. 
But New Jerseyans still suffer from an epidemic of gun violence – in no small measure 
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because firearms come into New Jersey from other States. Without strong national controls, 
this will remain a problem. That is why we passed a ban on all assault weapons and why we 
passed the Brady bill.  
Currently the Federal Government discourages a scenario whereby a given State decides not 
to enforce some worker health and safety laws as a way of lowering costs and attracting 
industry. A State right next door might feel compelled to lower its standards in order to 
remain competitive. In the absence of a Federal Standard, we would likely see a bidding war 
that lowers the quality of life for all Americans.  
These are some of a host of very fundamental, very basic, and even profound questions 
raised by the notion that we should never have unfunded mandates. These are questions each 
Member of the Senate should consider long and hard, before moving to drastically curtail—
or make impossible—any unfunded mandates.161 
After voting on 44 amendments and several cloture motions, the Senate approved S. 1 on January 
27, 1995, 86-10.162 
One of the amendments approved by the Senate was the “Byrd look-back amendment,” which is 
the only provision in UMRA that allows for the regulation of any mandates based on actual rather 
than estimated costs.163 It provided that legislation containing intergovernmental mandates would 
be considered funded, and hence not subject to a point of order, if it authorized appropriations to 
cover the estimated direct costs of the intergovernmental mandate and incorporated a prescribed 
mechanism requiring further review if, in any fiscal year, Congress did not appropriate funds 
sufficient to cover those costs. Under this mechanism, if the responsible federal agency 
determines that the appropriation provided was insufficient to cover the estimated direct costs of 
the mandate it shall notify the appropriate authorizing committees not later than 30 days after the 
start of the fiscal year and submit recommendations for either implementing a less costly mandate 
or making the mandate ineffective for the fiscal year. The statutory mechanism must also include 
expedited procedures for the consideration of legislative recommendations to achieve these 
outcomes not later than 30 days after the recommendations are submitted to Congress. Finally, the 
mechanism must provide that the mandate “shall be ineffective until such time as Congress has 
completed action on the recommendations of the responsible federal agency.”164 After Senator 
Robert Byrd offered this amendment, the Senate adopted it on January 26, 1995, 100-0.165 
The House companion bill to S. 1 was H.R. 5, the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995, which 
was co-sponsored by Representatives William F. Clinger, Jr., Rob Portman, Gary A. Condit, and 
Thomas M. Davis. It was reported by the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, 
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on January 13, 1995, by voice vote and without hearings.166 Floor consideration began on January 
20, 1995. Numerous amendments were introduced by Democratic Members to add various 
exemptions to the bill, such as the health of children and the disabled, the disposal of nuclear 
waste, and child support enforcement. These amendments were rejected on party-line votes. On 
February 1, 1995, H.R. 5 was adopted, 360-74, inserted into S. 1 as a House substitute, and sent 
to conference.167  
There were two major differences between the House and Senate versions of S. 1. The House 
version did not include the Byrd look-back amendment, and it permitted judicial review of federal 
agency compliance with the bill’s provisions. Initially, House conferees refused to accept the 
Byrd look-back amendment and Senate conferees; worried that outside parties could delay 
regulations for years by filing lawsuits, refused to accept judicial review of federal agency 
compliance with the bill’s provisions. Negotiations continued for six weeks. The deadlock over 
judicial review was ended by allowing judicial review of whether an appropriate analysis of 
mandate costs was done, but restricting the court’s ability to second-guess the quality of the cost 
estimates. The deadlock over the Byrd look-back amendment ended when House conferees 
accepted its inclusion after being assured that its intent was to make certain that Congress, rather 
than an executive agency, retained responsibility for setting policy.168 
The Senate adopted the conference report, which renamed the bill the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act of 1995, on March 15, 1995, 91-9, and the House adopted it the next day, 394-28. 
President Bill Clinton signed it on March 22, 1995.169 
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Appendix B. UMRA Points of Order 
1. Rep. Bill Archer, “Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996,“ House 
debate on motion to recommit H.R. 3136, Congressional Record, vol. 142, part 5 
(March 28, 1996), pp. 6931-6937. 
2. Rep. Rob Portman, “The Employee Commuting Act of 1996,” House debate on 
H.R. 1227, Congressional Record, vol. 142, part 9 (May 23, 1996), pp. 12283-
12287. 
3. Rep. Bill Orton, “The Welfare – Medicaid Reform Act of 1996,” House debate on 
H.R. 3734, Congressional Record, vol. 142, part 13 (July 18, 1996), p. 17668. 
4. Rep. Melvin Watt, “The Housing Opportunity and Responsibility Act,” House 
debate on H.R. 2, Congressional Record, vol. 143, part 5 (May 1, 1997), pp. 
7006-7012. 
5. Rep. John Ensign, “The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997,” House debate on 
H.R. 1270, Congressional Record, vol. 143, no, 148 (October 29, 1997), pp. H
9655-H9657. 
6. Rep. Gerald Soloman, “The Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education 
Reform Act of 1998,” House debate on the conference report for S. 1150, 
Congressional Record, vol. 144, part 8 (June 4, 1998), pp. H9655-H9657. 
7. Rep. Jerrold Nadler, “The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998,” House debate on 
H.R. 3150, Congressional Record, vol. 144, part 8 (June 10, 1998), pp. 11853-
11857. 
8. Rep. Steve Largent, “The Minimum Wage Increase Act,” House debate on H.R. 
3846, Congressional Record, vol. 144, part 2 (March 9, 2000), pp. 2623-2624. 
9. Rep. James Gibbons, “The Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 2000,” 
House debate on S. 1287, Congressional Record, vol. 146, part 2 (March 22, 
2000), pp. 3234-3236. 
10. Rep. John Conyers, “The Internet Nondiscrimination Act of 2000,” House debate 
on H.R. 3709, Congressional Record, vol. 146, part 6 (May 10, 2000), pp. 7483-
7485. 
11. Rep. Charles Stenholm, “The Medicare RX 2000 Act,” House debate on H.R. 
4680, Congressional Record, vol. 146, part 9 (June 28, 2000), pp. 12650-12653. 
12. Rep. Jim Moran, “The Department of Transportation Appropriations Act, 2002,” 
House debate on H.R. 2299, Congressional Record, vol. 147, part 9 (June 26, 
2001), pp. 11906-11910. 
13. Rep. James Gibbons, “The Yucca Mountain Repository Site Approval Act,” 
House debate on H.J.Res. 87, Congressional Record, vol. 148, part 5 (May 8, 
2002), pp. 7145-7148. 
14. Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee, “The Real ID Act of 2005,” House debate on H.R. 418, 
Congressional Record, vol. 151, no. 13 (February 9, 2005), pp. H437-H442. 
15. Rep. James McGovern, “The Energy Policy Act of 2005,” House debate on H.R. 
6, Congressional Record, vol. 151, no. 48 (April 20, 2005), pp. H2174-H2178. 
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16. Sen. Kit Bond, “The Transportation, Treasury, HUD and Independent Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 2006,” Senate debate on H.R. 3058, Congressional Record, 
vol. 151, no. 133 (October 19, 2005), p. S11547. 
17. Sen. Ted Kennedy, “The Transportation, Treasury, HUD and Independent 
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006,” Senate debate on H.R. 3058, Congressional 
Record, vol. 151, no. 133 (October 19, 2005), p. S11548. 
18. Rep. Jim McDermott, “The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005,” House debate on 
H.R. 4241, Congressional Record, vol. 151, no. 152 (November 17, 2005), pp. H
10531-H10534. 
19. Rep. Jim McDermott, “The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005,” House debate on 
H.Res. 653, Congressional Record, vol. 152, no. 10 (February 1, 2006), pp. H37-
H40. 
20. Rep. Tammy Baldwin, “The Communications Opportunity, Promotion, and 
Enhancement Act of 2006,” House debate on H.R. 5252, Congressional Record, 
vol. 152, no. 72 (June 8, 2006), pp. H3506-H3510. 
21. Rep. Jim McDermott, “The Federal Election Integrity Act of 2006,” House 
debate on H.R. 4844, Congressional Record, vol. 152, no. 118 (September 20, 
2006), pp. H6742-H6745. 
22. Rep. Pete Sessions, “The Children’s Health and Medicare Protections Act of 
2007,” House debate on H.R. 3162, Congressional Record, vol. 153, no. 124-125 
(August 1, 2007), pp. H9288-H9290. 
23. Rep. Pete Sessions, “The Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization 
Act of 2007,” House debate on H.R. 3963, Congressional Record, vol. 153, no. 
163 (October 25, 2007), pp. H12027-H12029. 
24. Rep. Jeff Flake, “Senate Amendments to H.R. 6, Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007,” House debate on H.R. 6, Congressional Record, vol. 153, 
no. 186 (December 6, 2007), pp. H4255-H4259. 
25. Rep. Mike Conaway, “The Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Tax Act 
of 2008,” House debate on H.R. 5351, Congressional Record, vol. 154, no. 32 
(February 27, 2008), pp. H1079-H1082. 
26. Rep. Paul Broun, “The Paul Wellstone Mental Health and Addiction Equity Act 
of 2007,” House debate on H.R. 1424, Congressional Record, vol. 154, no. 37 
(March 5, 2008), pp. H1259-H1262. 
27. Rep. Jeff Flake, “The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008,” House 
debate on H.R. 2419, Congressional Record, vol. 154, no. 79 (May 14, 2008), pp. 
H3784-H3789. 
28. Rep. Eric Cantor, “The Comprehensive American Energy Security and Consumer 
Protection Act,” House debate on H.R. 6899, Congressional Record, vol. 154, no. 
147 (September 16, 2008), pp. H8152-H8157. 
29. Rep. Jeff Flake, “The Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance and Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2009,” House debate on H.R. 2638, Congressional Record, 
vol. 154, no. 152 (September 24, 2008), pp. H9218-H9220. 
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30. Rep. David Drier, “The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,” House 
debate on H.R. 1, Congressional Record, vol. 155, no. 30 (February 13, 2009), 
pp. H1524-H1536. 
31. Rep. Jeff Flake, “The Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009,” House debate on H.R. 
1105, Congressional Record, vol. 155, no. 33 (February 25, 2009), pp. H2643-H
2646. 
32. Rep. Jeff Flake, “The Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug 
Administration Appropriations Act, 2010,” House debate on H.R. 2997, 
Congressional Record, vol. 155, no. 101 (July 8, 2009), pp. H7783-H7786. 
33. Rep. Jeff Flake, “The Military Construction and Veteran’s Affairs Appropriations 
Act, 2010,” House debate on H.R. 3082, Congressional Record, vol. 155, no. 103 
(July 10, 2009), pp. H7951-H7953. 
34. Rep. Jeff Flake, “The Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2010,” 
House debate on H.R. 3183, Congressional Record, vol. 155, no. 106 (July 15, 
2009), pp. H8107-H8109. 
35. Rep. Jeff Flake, “The Financial Services and General Government 
Appropriations Act, 2010,” House debate on H.R. 3170, Congressional Record, 
vol. 155, no. 107 (July 16, 2009), pp. H8191-H8193. 
36. Rep. Jeff Flake, “The Transportation, Housing and Urban Development 
Appropriations Act, 2010,” House debate on H.R. 3288, Congressional Record, 
vol. 155, no. 112 (July 23, 2009), pp. H8593-H8594. 
37. Rep. Jeff Flake, “The Departments of Labor, Health, and Human Services, and 
Education Appropriations Act, 2010,” House debate on H.R. 3293, 
Congressional Record, vol. 155, no. 113 (July 24, 2009), pp. H8593-H8594. 
38. Rep. Jeff Flake, “The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010,” House 
debate on H.R. 3326, Congressional Record, vol. 155, no. 116 (July 29, 2009), 
pp. H8977-H8978. 
39. Senator Robert Corker, “H.R. 3590, the Service Members Home Ownership Act 
of 2009,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 155, 
no. 199 (December 23, 2009), pp. S13803-S13804. 
40. Rep. Paul Ryan, “Providing for Consideration of Senate Amendments to H.R. 
3590, Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009, and Providing for 
Consideration of H.R. 4872, Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010,” House debate on H.Res. 1203, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 
156, no. 43 (March 21, 2010), pp. H1825-H1828. 
41. Rep. Jeff Flake, “Providing For Consideration of H.R. 5822, Military 
Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 
2011,” House debate on H.R. 5822, Congressional Record, vol. 156, no. 112 
(July 28, 2010), pp. H6206-H6209. 
42. Rep. Jeff Flake, “Providing For Consideration of H.R. 5850, Transportation, 
Housing And Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 
2011,” House debate on H.R. 5850, Congressional Record, vol. 156, no. 113 
(July 29, 2010), pp. H6298-H6290. 
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43. Rep. Jeff Flake, “Providing For Consideration of Senate Amendment to House 
Amendment to Senate Amendment to H.R. 4853, Tax Relief, Unemployment 
Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,” House debate on H.R. 
4853, Congressional Record, vol. 156, no. 157 (December 16, 2010), pp. H8525-
H8526. 
44. Rep. Keith Ellison, “Providing For Consideration of H.R. 1255, Government 
Shutdown Prevention Act of 2011,” House debate on H.Res. 194, Congressional 
Record, vol. 157, no. 46 (April 1, 2011), pp. H2219-H2222. 
45. Rep. John Garamendi, “Providing For Further Consideration of H.R. 1540, 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,” House debate on 
H.Res. 276, Congressional Record, vol. 157, no. 73 (May 25, 2011), pp. H3423-
H3424. 
46. Rep. Keith Ellison, “Providing For Consideration of H.R. 2017, Department of 
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2012,” House debate on H.Res. 287, 
Congressional Record, vol. 157, no. 77 (June 1, 2011), pp. H3816-H3818. 
47. Rep. John Garamendi, “Providing For Further Consideration of H.R. 2021, Jobs 
and Energy Permitting Act of 2011 and Providing for Consideration of H.R. 
1249, America Invents Act,” House debate on H.Res. 316, Congressional Record, 
vol. 157, no. 73 (June 22, 2011), pp. H4379-H.4380. 
48. Rep. Marcia Fudge, “Providing For Consideration of H.R. 1315, Consumer 
Financial Protection Safety and Soundness Improvement Act of 2011,” House 
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